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Cause lawyers maintain primary commitments to causes and pursue political and moral 
objectives that go well beyond the traditional lawyering objective of client service, which is the 
goal of most conventional lawyers. In this research I conduct in-depth interviews with cause 
lawyers involved in efforts for social change in post-Katrina New Orleans to develop a richer 
understanding of their roles within social movements and how they conceive of and negotiate the 
core tensions in their work. I investigate the lawyers’ roles within social movements situated in 
legal, political and social climates that are overwhelmingly inhospitable to their ultimate goals. 
Ultimately, this research presents a portrait of cause lawyers who develop alternative modes of 
practice that are more commonly associated with movement organizers and more closely aligned 
with movement goals of individual and community empowerment than are traditional models of 
lawyering. 
 
Key Words: social movements; social change; cause lawyers; lawyers; New Orleans; Hurricane 
Katrina
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
 
 Lawyers and legal strategies have long been employed by social movements in their 
efforts to effect change. But there exist a number of interesting and unresolved tensions 
surrounding the notion of lawyering for social change. First and foremost, social movement 
scholars, legal scholars, movement activists and activist lawyers vary in their assessments of the 
efficacy of the law as a vehicle for meaningful change. And for those who accept lawyering as a 
valid device for social change there exist more subtle social, political and practical challenges 
regarding appropriate models, professional roles and specific tactics. This research will explore 
how cause lawyers conceive of and negotiate these tensions in their work. 
 This study seeks to add to the evolving dialogue within socio-legal scholarship regarding 
relationships between cause lawyers and social movements. As a point of departure, this research 
engages with an overarching framework of inquiry outlined in recent work by law and society 
scholars (see Sarat and Scheingold 2006). My study is motivated by a similar line of inquiry built 
around the following core questions. 1) What do cause lawyers do for, and to, social movements? 
2) How, when, and why do social movements turn to and use lawyers and legal strategies? 3) In 
what ways do lawyers and legal strategies tend to advance or constrain movement goals? And, 4) 
How do lawyers shape movements and how do movements shape lawyers?  
 Broad areas of theory and research of relevance to this study include law and society 
scholarship on cause lawyering, social movement theory, critical theory, and the interdisciplinary 
socio-legal scholarship on lawyering for social change. I draw upon these scholarly traditions to 
better illuminate and sharpen the focus of the research. I turn to law and society scholarship for 
its important work that highlights the relationships between social movements and lawyers 
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working for social justice. It is within this field of research that scholars have developed the 
conceptual category of “cause lawyer” that is so central to this research. I look to social 
movement theory as a lens through which the work of cause lawyers and their associations with 
social movements might be approached. This research also draws generally upon the tradition of 
critical theory with a special focus on critical race theory, which has been the site of significant 
debate regarding the critique and defense of rights discourse that is especially relevant to this 
study. I also rely on socio-legal scholarship for key case studies examining the role of legalism in 
the trajectory of movements. I draw upon these areas of scholarship throughout this thesis, and 
apply specific attention to the most significant aspects of each in chapter three. 
 The principal technique of data collection for this research is in-depth, phenomenological 
interviews with cause lawyers involved in efforts for social change in New Orleans in the wake 
of Hurricane Katrina. I present and analyze the data provided by these informants, and then 
interpret these critical reflections through several appropriate theoretical lenses in order to 
develop a richer understanding of cause lawyers and their relationships to social movements. 
 This study contributes to theoretical and practical domains. It may prove useful to scholars 
as a depiction of how cause lawyers understand and negotiate key issues of concern to critical 
legal theorists. It may also prove valuable to lawyers who are interested in exploring and 
assessing alternative professional models. This research also contributes to the documentation of 
social movement activity and socio-legal activity in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
 Following this introduction, chapter two provides a more detailed discussion of the 
conceptual framework of this study. Elements of this framework include the background of this 
research, an exploration of the topic and research problem, the detailed purposes of the study, 
and its potential significance. In chapter three I present the scholarly theoretical background for 
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the study through a review of relevant literature that provides the theoretical foundation and 
relevant case studies against which the results of this research can be compared. In chapter four I 
delineate important elements of the research design and specific methods that I used, including 
the overall approach and rationale, population selection and sampling strategies, demographics 
of the respondents, data gathering procedures, and the procedures for analysis. This is followed 
by an analysis of the data in chapter five in which I present and interpret the findings. I present 
conclusions and offer recommendations for further research in the final chapter.
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
 
Having briefly introduced the genre and structure of this research, it is my task in this 
chapter to lay out a conceptual framework within which I conducted this study. I begin with a 
statement of how I came to focus on this topic for my research. Then I delve further into the 
topic and the central problem of this research. This is followed by short discussions of the 
purpose and significance of this work. I conclude the chapter with a section designed to 
introduce the reader to the significance of the specific context in which this research was 
conducted.  
Background 
The curiosity that inspires this research developed from my personal involvement and 
scholarly interests in an emergent post-Katrina self-determination movement in New Orleans. I 
came to New Orleans shortly after Katrina as a volunteer activist interested in supporting 
people’s efforts to ensure a just recovery and became involved in the emergent stages of a radical 
relief group. I began graduate studies about a year later and became interested in exploring the 
emergence of grassroots resistance in the recovery from a scholarly perspective. I began to view 
this social action that I was observing as an emergent self-determination movement and engaged 
in some preliminary research that probed a collection of stories and events for the meaning of 
these vital struggles (O’Connell 2006). Simultaneously, I began to consider the law as a possible 
career path on which I might integrate my scholarly interests with my interest in social justice 
activism. In this way, my personal, professional, and political interests have led me to this 
current stage of research that will shift focus from the nature of emergent grassroots organizing 
to the intersection of cause lawyering and social action.   
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I will begin to lay out the conceptual framework for this research by outlining the way in 
which I conceptualize the terms “cause lawyers” and “social movements” for the purposes of this 
project. These terms are used throughout this text and represent concepts at the core of the 
research problem, so in order to avoid confusion it is essential that I clarify at the outset how I 
understand and use these terms in the context of this research. 
I have adopted the term “cause lawyer” for use in this study to refer to a broad category 
of lawyers working for social justice. “Cause lawyering” is a term that law and society scholars, 
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold (2005), coined as an umbrella term to refer to certain types of 
lawyering that have variously been referred to as radical, activist, revolutionary, movement, 
empowerment, public interest, and community lawyering. Sarat and Scheingold explain, 
What we call cause lawyering is often referred to as public interest lawyering within the 
profession and among academics. However, we prefer cause lawyering because it is an 
inclusive term. It conveys a determination to take sides in a political and moral struggle 
without making decisions between worthy and unworthy causes. Conversely, to talk 
about public interest lawyering is to take on irresolvable disputes about what is, or is not, 
in the public interest. Whether the pursuit of any particular cause advances the public 
interest is very much in the eye of the beholder (p. 5). 
 
This scholarship conceives of cause lawyering as distinct from conventional lawyering in 
a variety of ways. At the core of the distinction is the notion that moral and political 
commitments are at the center of cause lawyers’ professional lives, whereas for most of their 
conventionally oriented peers these concerns are more marginal. “For cause lawyers, such 
objectives move from the margins to the center of their professional lives. Lawyering is for them 
attractive precisely because it is a deeply moral or political activity, a kind of work that 
encourages pursuit of their vision of the right, the good or the just” (Sarat and Scheingold 
2005:5). 
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 The work of these scholars and their colleagues has been key in the development of an 
understanding of the complex nature of the relationships between cause lawyers, social 
movements, and social change. Although cause lawyering projects are not restricted to any 
particular political orientation, I have chosen to limit my investigation to a subset of cause 
lawyers sometimes referred to as “left-activist lawyers” (Scheingold 1998) who work on various 
social justice causes in post-Katrina New Orleans. And, accordingly, when I refer to cause 
lawyers in this study this is the subset to which I refer. 
The term social movement is also key to this research, and so I must offer some 
clarification about how I define and use the term. Zald and McCarthy (1980) make a distinction 
between the broadly defined term social movement and the more concise and bounded social 
movement organizations. They define a social movement as a “set of opinions and beliefs in a 
population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure 
and/or reward distribution of a society” (p.2). Social movement organizations are specific 
enterprises that arise within the context of a broader social movement. Zald and McCarthy 
(1980) define a social movement organization “as a complex or formal organization, which 
defines its goals with the preferences of a social movement and attempts to implement these 
goals” (p.2). Further, they conceive of a social movement industry that is made up of all the 
social movement organizations with relatively similar goals (p.2). 
I use the term social movement in this thesis to refer to its broader use that covers all 
activities, and even beliefs and preferences, aimed at changing a particular element of society 
through collective action. This usage is aligned with Zald and McCarthy’s conceptualization of a 
general social movement and their idea of a broad social movement industry. I chose to adopt this 
perspective on cause lawyering for social change within a broadly defined movement rather than 
 6
just focusing on social movement organizations because of the particular setting in which I was 
conducting the research. As I describe later in this chapter, I came to recognize a broad, 
emergent, post-Katrina movement for self-determination and a just recovery for all. The dynamic 
context of the post-Katrina social movement environment gave rise to a broad and loosely-knit 
social movement coalition consisting of pre-existing and well-established social movement 
organizations, emergent groups focused on a variety of issues, neighborhood organizations that 
morphed into social justice advocacy groups, and many unaffiliated residents and allies 
motivated to find ways to take collective action to further their goals of a just recovery. 
I made the decision to focus on a broader understanding of social movements early on in 
the research process and discovered later, during the data gathering process, that this view is 
aligned with how the cause lawyers themselves understand and relate to the big picture of post-
Katrina social movements of which they are a part. Their work encompasses a variety of diverse 
causes, practice settings, and professional tactics. Cause lawyers in New Orleans work on behalf 
of post-Katrina civil rights and human rights movements, a movement focused on a right to 
return for all displaced residents, the environmental justice movement, the labor movement, and 
a movement to encourage government accountability and citizen engagement in the rebuilding 
process. Within these diverse yet interconnected movements, these cause lawyers help support 
social movement organizations, neighborhood groups, and individuals working on a number of 
specific social justice causes including access to healthcare, access to affordable and public 
housing, housing discrimination issues, access to and equity within public education, workers’ 
rights, voting rights and criminal justice reform. Among the services that cause lawyers provide 
are litigation support, legal advice, organizational support, media outreach and awareness 
raising, educational programs and access to accurate and updated recovery information. Amidst 
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this diversity of causes and models of service provision there is a pervasive, common recognition 
among respondents and movement activists of a broadly defined and still developing movement 
for self-determination and a just recovery for all. This broad view is the one that I take in this 
exploration of cause lawyers and social movements.  
Topic and Statement of the Problem 
From Marc Galanter’s (1974) classic article “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: 
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change” to more recent explorations, such as Derrick Bell’s 
(2004) Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial 
Reform, law and society scholars have for decades explored questions of the capacity of the law 
to effect lasting social change. Despite landmark court cases and significant legislative victories, 
many of these scholars take a comprehensive view of generations of struggles in American 
courts and point out that legal change has produced little lasting improvement in the economic 
and social circumstances of historically oppressed communities. There are many different 
explanations offered for this. Some say that relying on rights discourse and remedy through the 
courts reinforces and legitimates a legal system that is established to protect special interests and 
to maintain a system of inequality. Others point out that resources must be mobilized by those 
who seek remedy in court and that these resources are difficult to access for those seeking 
remedy. Some say that isolated legal victories can easily be negated outside of court. Others say 
that the courts have limited institutional power and are not strong enough to operate on the level 
necessary to effect meaningful social change. Some recognize the symbolic value of rights 
claiming and how legal mobilization can be important for social movement organizing that can 
result in the employment of other tactics for change. But generally, after decades of scholarship 
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and debate there remains a scholarly skepticism of the utility of the law to effect substantial 
social change on its own (Galanter 1974; Rosenberg 1991; Albiston 1999; Bell 2004). 
I want to learn about how cause lawyers experience and understand the apparent conflict 
between their commitments to seek social change through the practice of law and the deep 
ambivalence expressed by many scholars, activists, and even by cause lawyers themselves 
concerning the power of the law and the tactic of litigation to create enduring social change in 
the post-civil rights era. This is a core tension in this work at the root of the research problem. It 
is also just one of several other important tensions in the work of cause lawyering in the context 
of a social movement that have bearing on this study. This work seeks to draw out these other 
tensions from the literature and from the narratives of cause lawyers. 
A defining characteristic of cause lawyers is that they clearly express certain political 
commitments and have chosen the law as a path for their social activism. These decidedly “anti-
establishment” lawyers, who have devoted their professional lives to a fight against the status 
quo in their efforts for social change, maintain a level of belief in the liberating potential of the 
law. And yet an apparent paradox exists in their efforts to effect radical change within the 
context of a judicial system which can arguably be seen as one of the most entrenched 
institutions of the establishment. 
The political and social tensions that must be negotiated in the profession of law in the 
interest of social change may prove to be particularly challenging for the committed cause 
lawyer. Much of what these lawyers are confronted with stems from their stated objectives to 
struggle for the empowerment of people, groups and movements for whom and with whom they 
work. This work is inherently political in nature and it occurs in a dynamic social context in 
which roles, relationships, meanings and choices about collective action are greatly contested. 
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This research identifies and further explores a number of these tensions that have been explored 
in the literature. It also explores the narratives of cause lawyers for expressions of these and 
other critical tensions in an effort to understand how cause lawyers negotiate these core issues in 
their work with social movements. This research seeks to illuminate these paradoxes and uncover 
the unique ways that cause lawyers, grappling with these tensions, understand these dynamics 
and how this shapes their practice. 
Purpose 
 The central purpose of this study is to harness the power of qualitative inquiry to uncover 
and explore how cause lawyers conceive of and deal with the multiple, often paradoxical, 
political, social and professional tensions in their work with social movements. Through the 
methodology of phenomenological design this research highlights themes and patterns that 
emerge from interviews with cause lawyers to reveal a portrait of the phenomenon of cause 
lawyering from the emic perspective of the lawyers interviewed. This portrait is compared and 
contrasted through a critical lens against the way that theorists, practitioners, and movement 
activists problematize the political, social and practical complexities of cause lawyering and its 
relationship to social movements. 
 This research adopts a general framework of inquiry borrowed from recent work in the 
field of law and society scholarship (see Sarat and Scheingold 2006). This framework serves the 
following broad purposes. It is designed to shed light on what lawyers do for, and to, social 
movements. It aims to uncover how, when, and why social movements turn to and use lawyers 
and legal strategies. It considers ways in which the use of lawyers and legal strategies tend to 
advance or constrain the achievement of movement goals. And it hopes to depict how 
movements shape the lawyers who serve them and how lawyers shape the movements. This 
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research will add to recent developments in the field of law and society through an exploration of 
these questions mainly from the perspective of cause lawyers in the particular context of post-
Katrina New Orleans by fleshing out the deep meaning of these critical tensions and how they 
play out in practice. 
Significance 
 This research will contribute to the theoretical, scholarly literature by effectively 
providing a mini-case study in a real and dynamic context by which theories can be further 
tested. This research has potential to contribute to the realm of socio-legal theory, in so far as it 
might be used to apply and evaluate notions of the law and its relationship to social change as 
conceptualized by law and society scholars, social movement theorists, critical race theorists and 
critical legal studies scholars.  
 This research is also potentially significant to practitioners. The central themes and 
lessons that emerge from the analysis of this research might be used as tools by other cause 
lawyers seeking to understand similar tensions in their work. The successes and struggles 
expressed by the informants in this research may help inform the development of other cause 
lawyers. Movement activists seeking to better understand critical issues in their relationships 
with cause lawyers may also find this study useful. 
 And finally, the context of post-Katrina New Orleans as the particular site selection for 
this research suggests a certain level of significance. The horrors of the aftermath of Katrina 
exposed critical issues of social inequality that have only been exasperated by widespread failure 
of official recovery efforts. The struggle for a just recovery that has emerged out of post-Katrina 
New Orleans and the spotlight that this has placed on social inequity is becoming widely 
acknowledged as a crucial moment in a number of on-going struggles for social justice (Rathke 
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and Labostrie 2006; Arena 2007; Swan 2007). Enlisted in these struggles are community 
organizations with long histories in New Orleans, a community of cause lawyers with long term 
commitments to working for social justice in these communities, as well as emergent groups and 
an increasing number of national allies. This exploration of cause lawyering for social change in 
this critical time and place may be especially revealing. 
Setting the Scene 
 In chapter four I provide some description of the particular sample population of cause 
lawyers and their work to bring some context to their narratives. But before doing so, I will 
provide the reader with some broader context in which to place the subjects and their narratives. 
I draw upon selected examples of the growing body of literature on the post-Katrina context and 
the literature on social movement responses to Katrina in order to demonstrate the significance of 
the context in which this research is grounded. I mentioned briefly in the background section of 
this chapter that this thesis research emerged from some exploratory research that I conducted 
that focused on post-Katrina emergent social movement activity. I draw upon observations that I 
made in this initial stage of research to supplement the discussion of this literature in this section. 
George Lipsitz (2006) locates and describes a “culture of hostile privatism” deeply rooted 
in contemporary American culture that has colored the official national response to Katrina. He 
writes that this culture has given rise to a “free market fundamentalism” that is evident in the 
official approach to the rebuilding of New Orleans. This market driven approach that Lipsitz 
identifies is evident in many of the policy decisions to which post-Katrina social movements are 
reacting. Among these are the dismantling of public housing and public healthcare facilities to 
make way for private development opportunities, the move toward privatization of public 
education, and the lack of viable large scale social programs to adequately support the recovery 
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needs of residents. Lipsitz also notes that the very same free market fundamentalism that is being 
promoted in the rebuilding of New Orleans “replicates the exact actions, values and practices 
that made the hurricane so disastrous in the first place” (p.452). He notes a history of valuing 
property and the interests of big business more than people that encouraged the development and 
destruction of the wetlands that historically protected New Orleans from storms. He points to the 
“faith- and finance-based approach to science and glorification of private gain” (p.452) that has 
led the U.S. government to deny claims of global warming, which has likely increased the 
frequency and intensity of storms. He notes that a systematic disinvestment in infrastructure, 
including levees and storm drains, put the city at greater risk. And he suggests that the 
privatization of public services, the failure to enforce fair housing laws and the “evisceration of 
the social wage promoted by union busting, capital flight, and tax breaks for business” (p.452-
453) left the most vulnerable residents of New Orleans trapped in unsafe housing, unable to 
secure transportation for evacuation and exposed to deplorable conditions in the aftermath of the 
hurricane. 
Similarly, Jamie Peck (2006) recognizes an historic process of evisceration of public 
services and disinvestment in the city that contributed to decades of social and economic decline 
that left a large segment of the New Orleans population highly vulnerable to the effects of the 
inevitable big storm. Peck notes that in the wake of Katrina there was an outpouring of 
conservative commentary, editorializing, and policy advocacy from conservative think tanks that 
“aggressively and effectively peddled… neoconservative/neoliberal ideas that dominated the 
post-Katrina policy debate” (p.705). Peck notes that the initial shock of the horrors of Katrina 
only briefly laid bare the inequities and limitations of the operating model of American 
neoliberalism and that “[w]ithin the space of  a few months, if not weeks, it had become clear 
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that the longer-run outcomes of Katrina would not be a reversal of, or even a midcourse 
adjustment in, the process of neoliberalization but, in fact, an acceleration of its extant programs 
of social regression and market governance” (p.708). 
Naomi Klein (2007) names and investigates on a global scale, with particular attention to 
post-Katrina New Orleans, a process of “disaster capitalism.” She uses the term to signify the 
“rapid-fire corporate reengineering of societies that are reeling from shock.” She investigates the 
aftermath of disasters around the world and recognizes patterns of state and corporate interests 
stepping in to intervene in the reconstruction process to benefit elite and corporate interests. 
Lipsitz (2006) writes that from the perspective of the elites controlling national policy, “New 
Orleans must be rebuilt for the convenience of investors, entrepreneurs, and owners. From this 
vantage point, the black residents of the city who suffered so terribly during and after the 
hurricane are not people who have problems, but instead they are the problems” (p. 451). This is 
the context in which post-Katrina social justice movements struggle. 
Lipsitz, Peck and other scholars writing in their vein share the sentiment expressed by 
Doane (2007) that “[it] is essential to remind the nation that the scope of the disaster, the failed 
response and the racially disparate impact did not just ‘happen,’ but that they were the natural 
outcome of the social dynamics that create and reproduce racism and poverty in American 
society” (p. 117). Scholars writing about the context of Katrina in a variety of disciplines have 
chosen to describe the event as an “unnatural disaster” in order to point out that the effects of 
Katrina were caused by much more than an extreme weather event (Hartmann and Squires 2006; 
Horne 2006; Laska and Morrow 2006; Reed 2006; Steinberg 2006). Douglas Brinkley (2006) 
draws upon hundreds of oral histories interviews and arrives at the conclusion that Katrina was 
not a natural disaster at all but a failure of government, “one that, through breached levees and 
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massive government incompetence, the country brought upon itself” (Brinkley as cited in Stein 
and Preuss 2006). Bates and Swan (2007a) call the catastrophe following Hurricane Katrina a 
“social disaster: a disaster predicated upon and exacerbated by structural inequality and human 
decision-making,” and go on to write that “A social disaster can be triggered by a natural event 
such as a hurricane, but ultimately it is rooted in the choices a society makes and the 
prioritization of some lives over others” (p. 5).  
This understanding of the social disaster at the root of Katrina is not one that is 
exclusively held by academics. In a preliminary interview for the stage of my research that 
preceded this thesis project, New Orleans resident and activist Malik Rahim stated, “Katrina is 
only the most recent disaster in a long line of social disasters” (Rahim 2006). He went on to 
illustrate how New Orleans society, in particular, and American society, in general, have been 
plagued by a long history of oppression based on race, class and gender. A theme that emerged 
clearly from this research is that there exists among the grassroots in New Orleans a collective 
understanding of how structural inequalities based largely on race and class issues compounded 
the problems of the disaster and informed the reactions of the grassroots response (O’Connell 
2006). New Orleanian activist and writer Jordan Flaherty (2005) wrote of “the disaster before the 
disaster of racism, corruption, deindustrialization, and neglect” (p. 25). Similarly, on December 
6, 2005, neighborhood activist and life-long New Orleanian, Dyan French, more commonly 
known as Mama D, testified at a congressional hearing in Washington D.C. that pre-Katrina 
racism created conditions that increased suffering and slowed an official response to the majority 
poor and black neighborhoods of New Orleans (CBS News 2005). The notion that the disaster is 
rooted in structural inequalities is important to this thesis research because the lawyers and the 
movement people with whom they are allied maintain similar notions and explain much of their 
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activities as being aimed towards a more just society that would not allow such humanitarian 
disasters to occur. 
The continued failure of the official response of the various levels of government and 
major relief agencies to support the needs of those struggling most for their own survival and 
recovery greatly compounds the social effects of Katrina. In this context, people-powered, 
grassroots, progressive alliances have emerged to help fill the gaps left in the official response 
(Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006; Bates and Swan 2007b). As bad as conditions were 
for many in New Orleans in the wake of Katrina, and as difficult as conditions remain for some, 
the catastrophe would have been much worse were it not for such efforts from the grassroots. 
Not only do these community responses proceed without the support of government aid, they are 
often obstructed by government agencies and development of policies that are often at odds with 
humanitarian goals of supporting the most vulnerable communities and individuals (Agid 2007; 
Bates and Swan 2007b). Scott Weinstein, a volunteer nurse who helped open a free community 
clinic immediately after the storm writes that “a pattern emerged immediately after the storm of 
thousands of competent people and groups only able to help others, receive help, or help 
themselves by sidestepping official agencies and rules that obstruct and frustrate rescue and 
relief efforts” (Weinstein 2005). This is a pattern of grassroots activity that persists at the time of 
this writing, nearly two and a half years later, well into the recovery phase. This is a phenomenon 
that Klein (2007) refers to as “the rise of the people’s reconstruction” that is the “antithesis of the 
disaster capitalist complex’s ethos” (p.466). 
One of my interests in my earlier stage of research centered on the fact New Orleanians 
struggling for survival in the wake of Katrina were depicted as either helpless or criminal, a 
consequence of a tragically inadequate official response that is consistent with a long history of 
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city, state, and federal government abdicating responsibility for public welfare in crisis situations 
and (Bates and Ahmed 2007; Miller and Rivera 2007). Yet amidst this national image of failure 
there is a parallel story of self-determination, mutual aid, and people-powered direct action 
emerging from the grassroots. These post-Katrina stories of resistance, resilience and collective 
organizing are rooted in a unique culture of resistance developed over hundreds of years of 
community and individual struggles in the face of official neglect, oppression and white 
supremacy (Flaherty 2005). As one woman, a Creole elder, from the Seventh Ward of New 
Orleans flatly told me in a preliminary interview, “This ain’t nothin’ new, baby. We know how to 
struggle.” 
This initial stage of my research clearly explodes the popular myth shaped by the media 
and widespread race and class prejudice that those struggling for survival in post-Katrina New 
Orleans were either helpless victims or immoral criminals. Instead, I found that the survivors of 
Katrina are, by and large, ordinary people doing extraordinary things in the context of horrible 
circumstances of abandonment and neglect. This early assessment has since been supported by a 
growing body of literature on the general post-Katrina social and political context and the 
research on social movement responses to Katrina. Rodriguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli (2006), 
in their research that relies primarily on fieldwork in the aftermath of Katrina supplemented with 
an extensive database of media reports and a series of government documents, conclude that 
despite media reports of widespread antisocial behavior, the primary response to the catastrophe 
was prosocial and that much of this was in the form of emergent collective organization. The 
collective efforts that I documented are examples of spontaneous direct action responses to 
critical survival needs. The emergence of grassroots leaders influenced the nature of the people-
powered response to the struggle in New Orleans. These leaders and many of the other social 
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movement constituents have led lives steeped in a culture of resistance that shapes their 
worldview and influences how they organize. These organizing models are distinctly anti-
authoritarian, people-powered, resistive, self-determinant, loosely structured and organically 
developing.  
The primary purpose of my thesis research is not to thoroughly document these 
grassroots efforts or their historical roots, but it is important to provide a bit more context in 
order to at least partially understand the movement environment in which the cause lawyers at 
the heart of this research operate. So I will elaborate a bit more on the findings of my earlier 
research into the evolving post-Katrina social movement activity. 
This initial stage of research demonstrated a popular recognition among movement 
leaders that the continued failure of government has spurred a mobilization of the grassroots to 
respond to critical needs. This understanding was also sometimes reflected in the mass media. 
On September 2, 2005, The New York Times published an editorial entitled, “The Man-Made 
Disaster” that pointed out the utter failure of government to respond to the situation in New 
Orleans. The editorial states that disaster planners were “well aware that New Orleans could be 
flooded by the combined effects of a hurricane and broken levees, yet somehow the government 
was unable to rise to the occasion.” This is just one example of the widely documented 
government failure that is often perceived by movement participants as willful neglect (see also 
Check 2007). Throughout the research process, I encountered examples of this collective belief 
in the willful neglect and abandonment of social responsibilities by government. The 
development of this popular notion and the role it has played is compatible with theories of 
collective behavior. “Present in all collective behavior is some kind of belief that prepares the 
participants for action” (Smelser 1962: 79). The notion of willful neglect by the government 
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prior to, during, and after Katrina is a theme that motivated an anti-authoritarian, do-it-yourself, 
direct action response to the needs of those left behind. 
The phenomenon of cause lawyers working in support of social movements is seen in this 
research as one aspect of a locally-driven, post-Katrina, social movement that emerged from a 
rich tradition of social protest and self-determination. These efforts are decentralized and consist 
of a broad network of autonomous individuals and groups that support and communicate with 
one another but function separately. From an outsider’s perspective this “movement” may appear 
disorganized and fractured and therefore less than optimally effective. But several informants in 
my early stage of research put forth the idea that this model has proved to be politically 
necessary because popular movements have a history of being undermined by the state and other 
opposing interests. This notion is supported by the literature on social movements (see Piven and 
Cloward 1978; Jones 1998). Despite the sometimes ephemeral nature of post-Katrina 
movements, some are beginning to recognize that a broadly defined movement for a just 
recovery of New Orleans may prove to be one of the longer sustained social movements in US 
history (Laska 2007).  
So what has emerged in the wake of Katrina is a movement consisting of a loosely-knit 
coalition of local residents and dozens of groups with various organizational frameworks, 
political perspectives, and areas of focus, taking action on a number of levels to do the vital work 
necessary to heal communities and rebuild New Orleans. Cause lawyers rooted in these 
communities and networks of social action play an integral role in this process. This research 
seeks to discover how these lawyers situated in this context understand their roles, how they 
understand their relationships to post-Katrina self-determination movements and how they 
negotiate the challenges therein.  
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Those involved in post-Katrina social movement activity, including the participants in 
this study, generally have a deeper agenda then just returning to the status quo. The subjects of 
this research have participated in movement activity that aims to meet immediate survival needs 
and assist in the recovery and rebuilding efforts in a way that attempts to effect social change at 
the level that would attack the root causes of the social disaster in New Orleans. There is 
evidence in their speech and actions of a belief that Katrina has created an opportunity for 
significant change. In fact, the histories of disaster, inadequate government response, emergence 
of indigenous leadership and people led initiatives for change contain examples of disasters 
leading to significant political change. Flaherty (2005) points to the following historical 
examples. “The inadequate response of government to the 1985 Mexico City earthquake fueled a 
grassroots response that helped end decades of one party rule in Mexico. Corruption and stealing 
of post-earthquake material aide in 1972 helped end the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. And 
the 1927 Great Flood of the Mississippi gave rise to a political movement that helped elect Huey 
P. Long governor of Louisiana” (p.28). 
 In the context of a social movement arising out of disaster response, it is a goal of this 
research to bring forth the role of the cause lawyer in the grassroots networks that develop when 
official state structures prove to be inadequate. The cause lawyers at the center of this research 
were thrust into the center of the disaster response effort by virtue of their established alliances 
with grassroots leaders, community groups, and unaffiliated ordinary citizens, as well as for the 
simple fact that they too were, for the most part, severely impacted by the disruptions of the 
aftermath of Katrina and became active in collective movements as part of their own recovery. In 
this thesis research I seek to learn about the relationships between cause lawyers and social 
movements as one aspect of the critical, yet under-recognized, emergent grassroots responses in 
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post-Katrina New Orleans. The contextual background of post-Katrina social movement activity 
presented here along with the narrative material, supporting data, and analysis of this research 
serve as resources for developing a richer understanding of how cause lawyers interact with these 
collective movements for social justice. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Context 
 
 In this section I highlight and elaborate on the key theoretical and empirical 
developments from previous scholarship that provide the important foundations of this study and 
influence the framing of the research questions, the design of the research, and the interpretation 
of the findings. Three distinct but related areas of scholarship provide a solid ground from which 
this study can proceed. I have selected elements from law and society scholarship, social 
movement theory, and critical race theory based on what they can do to aid in the understanding 
of the key issues in this research.  Each of these areas of scholarship contributes in its own way 
to this research and builds upon each of the others to provide a useful framework of background 
literature upon which to rely. 
 Initially, I look to a diverse collection of literature from law and society scholars that 
sharpens the focus of this research at the outset by outlining and developing the conceptual 
category of cause lawyer. This work also highlights some of the important learnings from 
previous work in the field on the relationships between cause lawyers and social movements.  
This rather legal-centric work is balanced by exploring ways in which key contributions from the 
tradition of social movement theory can bolster the understanding of cause lawyering vis-à-vis 
the social movement perspective. Critical legal theory, specifically critical race theory, adds to 
the picture a critical analysis of the uses of law and a theoretical discussion of rights discourse 
that is central to this study. And finally, I return to law and society scholarship for a comparison 
of intensive case studies of social movements and legal mobilization that provide historical 
contexts in which to explore some of the broad questions of this research.  
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A number of key themes emerge from a horizontal analysis across this literature that help 
focus this study of cause lawyers and social movements. One is that there exists contention about 
whether, to what degree, and under what conditions the law can be employed by movements to 
effect social change. The nature of this contention will be explored throughout the course of this 
study. A related theme is that the work of social justice movement lawyers is rife with 
contradictions based on negotiating these challenges and, as a result, they have developed 
sophisticated ways to understand and deal with these tensions in their work with social 
movements. Another theme that surfaces from the literature is that the law is employed by social 
movements and their lawyers in many subtle ways, such that it is experienced as neither just a 
resource nor just a constraint. 
Law and Society Scholarship 
 The interdisciplinary work of law and society scholars has been key in the development 
of an understanding of the complex nature of the relationships among cause lawyers, social 
movements, and social change. Three important edited volumes containing the empirical and 
theoretical work of a broad spectrum of law and society scholars have been published in the last 
decade (Sarat and Scheingold 1998; 2004; 2006). These volumes provide a record of the 
development of scholarly thought related to cause lawyering. The first of these collections 
focuses on the question of how some lawyers challenge conventional ideas of the profession of 
law through their radical commitment to causes (Sarat and Scheingold 1998). The second 
anthology shifts focus to an investigation of how these lawyers construct cases and the ways in 
which causes offer lawyers “something to believe in” that provides meaning for their work (Sarat 
and Scheingold 2004). The most recent contribution shifts from an analysis of causes to a view 
of social movements in particular and from a look at the relationship between cause lawyering 
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and professionalism to the explicitly political work of cause lawyers (Sarat and Scheingold 
2006). I seek to ground my research in this tradition that has greatly contributed to my 
understanding of cause lawyers and piqued my curiosity to learn more. 
Sarat and Scheingold (2006) provide an historical context in which to view the challenges 
faced by movements and movements lawyers. They present the findings of an array of scholars 
who look at the life cycle of movements and movement lawyering. These scholars seek to 
understand how changes in society over time offer movements and their lawyers special 
opportunities and challenges that shape actions and inform how movement lawyers interact with 
the courts, society-at-large and the constituents of the movements for whom they work. 
McCann and Dudas (2006) provide an analysis that shows “how the relatively favorable 
context for rights-based, legally oriented social movement activity in the United States in the 
middle part of the twentieth century gave way to an increasingly unsupportive, hostile context by 
the century’s end” (p.38). Even though the legalistic rights-based approach intended to spur 
increases in social movement activity through widespread public sympathy and eventually elite 
support has certainly not been abandoned and is still relied on as a strategic tool of social 
movements, the shift in responsiveness of American culture and in the realm of the courts against 
applying rights-based arguments for social change has created an atmosphere that has 
encouraged lawyers to examine other strategies and possible roles they might play within social 
movements. As the external political opportunity structure shifts, such that legal tactics become 
less effective, a possible role of the cause lawyer is to assess this shift and then to participate in 
alternative strategizing with other movement members. 
Social Movement Theory 
 In the initial stages of this research it became apparent that much of the cause lawyering 
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literature is quite legal-centric, such that important perspectives seem to be missing from much 
of the cause lawyering literature. Jones (2008) recently noted, “In fact, existing theories and 
empirical work on social movements often are ignored, even when these theories clearly provide 
relevant support for the vast empirical work on cause lawyers” (p.i). Because the researchers in 
this field are just beginning to explore ways to bring social movement theory into the study of 
cause lawyering there are few published examples of this to which my research can turn. So one 
of the projects of this research is to begin to explore ways that the study of cause lawyers can 
draw on social movement theories and concepts to explain phenomena. 
 Social movement theory has evolved to focus on three related factors that researchers use 
to systematically analyze the complex, interrelated features of social movements. These are the 
“political opportunities” that encourage the emergence and growth of social movements, the 
“mobilization of resources” that is at the core of social movement organizing, and the “framing 
process” by which movements define their identities and goals (McAdam 1982; McCann 1994; 
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996). None of these theoretical approaches is comprehensive 
enough to take into account all of the complexities of social movement dynamics. But despite the 
limits of each perspective, when taken together, each in turn builds on the other and adds to our 
ability to understand the complex dynamics of social movements.  In the following pages I 
identify key features of these three perspectives on social movement dynamics that I find useful 
for this study.  
 “Political opportunity structure,” applied to the world outside a social protest movement, 
has been the focus of much research and theory development related to political protest. This 
approach to understanding social movements emphasizes the connection between activist efforts 
and more mainstream institutional politics. The basic premise is that factors originating outside 
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of the movement “enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to 
be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for 
movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy” (Meyer and Minkhoff 
2004:1457-58). In other words, various aspects of social movement activity often correlate with 
the relative openness of the political environment external to the movement. The challenge 
facing researchers concerned with political opportunity and social protest is trying to understand 
which aspects of the external world affect the development of social movements and how this 
development is affected. Tarrow (1994) offers a succinct and helpful definition of political 
opportunity structure: “consistent — but not necessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of 
the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by 
affecting their expectations for success or failure” (p. 95). 
 There are a number of ways that the political opportunity concept is useful in an 
examination of the relationships between lawyers and social movements. There is some evidence 
that cause lawyers do participate in the assessment of political opportunity and consult with 
movement leaders about when best to employ certain strategies (Jones 2006). And in the event 
that the political opportunity structure is unfavorable to movement action, the cause lawyer may 
become active in trying to push for changes that may open up opportunities in the external 
political opportunity structure. It is possible but uncommon that certain legal tactics may open an 
opportunity for social action that did not previously exist. 
 The political opportunity structure perspective on social movement development is an 
interesting way to look at post-Katrina social movement activity. As catastrophic as the 
aftermath of Katrina proved to be, it can also be seen as a moment of opening opportunities. In 
fact, the framing of Katrina as an opportunity for change is a particularly noticeable element of 
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post-Katrina popular discourse in New Orleans. In fact, when I first came to New Orleans as a 
volunteer shortly after Katrina, many formal institutions of society were either severely 
debilitated or altogether non-functional, and there was a clear sense among the local and out-of-
town activists whom I met that, despite all of the tragedy around us, the circumstances presented 
an opportunity for change because “business-as-usual” had come to a screeching halt. 
 Whether or not the disruptions of Katrina actually did usher in any real formal structural 
shifts in the political landscape that provided openings for historically marginalized groups to 
gain traction is a subject for a different research project. But it appears that, the top to bottom 
societal “shake-up” of Katrina was perceived by some as representing a possible shift in political 
opportunity, such that social movement participants were energized to organize and raise their 
expectations for success. It is possible that Katrina actually resulted in a more restrictive political 
opportunity structure for New Orleans social justice movements, one that is even less hospitable 
to claimants fighting for change. But the perception that there was a shift in the political 
opportunity structure was sufficient to positively affect the mobilization of social justice 
movements. This view is in line with a strain of social movement literature that suggests 
perceptions of political opportunity are far more important to collective action than the actual 
strength of institutional or opposing political forces (Kurzman 1996). 
 The political opportunity approach to analyzing social movement activity may be 
somewhat useful to the particular discussion of the roles that lawyers play within movements as 
collaborators on movement strategy when they assess and report back to grassroots organizers 
their perceptions of change or lack of change to the structures of political opportunity. But 
certainly the political opportunity structure approach is not sufficient to explain all aspects of 
social movement activity. For instance, it does little to explain the clearly defiant, resistive 
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strains of movement activity that rise up in the face of obviously restrictive and inhospitable 
political opportunity structures. And in fact, one might argue that historically and in the 
contemporary context, this is the type of environment in which social movements operate in New 
Orleans.  
 The political opportunity approach to understanding aspects of the cause lawyer/social 
movement relationship is most beneficial to this study if used in conjunction with other 
theoretical approaches, each in turn adding to our understanding of the various aspects of social 
movement activity. Some scholars have sought to understand the ways in which lawyers and 
legal strategies are employed by social movements within the context of resource mobilization 
theory. This branch of theoretical work emphasizes the importance of resources to social 
movements. Mobilization is "the process of forming crowds, groups, associations, and 
organizations for the pursuit of collective goals" (Oberschall 1973:159). The idea is that 
organizations do not "spontaneously emerge" but require the mobilization of resources. Also 
found within resource mobilization theory is the notion that discontent is not sufficient to give 
rise to social movements. The relative power of the aggrieved is in large part measured by their 
ability to mobilize resources (Oberschall 1973). Resource mobilization theory views resources as 
more than just financial. In fact, the most important resource to social movements may be their 
people. Money, hours of labor, and specific skill sets are obvious important resources that enable 
movements to build organizations and launch effective struggles to attain their objectives. Social 
movement scholars also extend the resource mobilization approach to view less tangible but 
equally critical elements such as knowledge, solidarity and legitimacy, as important resources to 
movements (Kitschelt 1991:326-330). 
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 In this light, cause lawyers can be seen as participants in the resource mobilization 
process for social movements in two ways, as a particular type of resource to be mobilized and as 
movement participants engaged in garnering of other resources.  On a basic level, cause lawyers 
themselves can be resources for a movement. The cause lawyers in this study, as I will provide 
evidence for later, see themselves as being in support roles within the larger movement, as a 
resource ready to be mobilized. Legal mobilization, the work that cause lawyers do, can be seen 
as a special case of resource mobilization. Another way in which the work of cause lawyers for 
social movements can be seen through the resource mobilization approach is that they are a 
limited resource. There is a relative scarcity of lawyers who are qualified, willing and able to do 
the support work needed by movements. Lawyers are constrained by commitments to other 
causes and by a need to earn money that is most always in short supply in social movements. 
 Cause lawyers bring with them professional skills and connections to other assets 
(relationships with national advocacy organizations, law student volunteers, etc.) that can be 
mobilized to build movements and exploit opportunities for change. But a key insight of resource 
mobilization theory is that resources often come with strings attached; that is, they not only 
support collective movements, but they often steer movements into channels favored by the 
resource suppliers (Edwards and McCarthy 2004 cited in Cummings 2006:311). The process by 
which lawyers are mobilized as a resource, precisely what they bring to social movements and 
the effects that legal mobilization has on social movements will be analyzed in the course of this 
research.  
 The third approach used by social movement scholars to better understand how 
movements operate is the process of framing. I employ key aspects of this perspective in my 
analysis of the work that cause lawyers do for social movements. Framing refers to the process 
 29
of assigning meaning to or interpreting relevant events and conditions in ways that tend to 
mobilize core constituencies and garner popular support (Snow and Bedford 1992). The framing 
perspective has become integral to the study of social movements because of the idea that before 
collective action is likely to occur, a critical mass of people must engage in a process of social 
construction of a sense of injustice (Piven and Cloward 1977; McAdam 1982). This is the 
process of collective framing that focuses the energy of a social movement. 
 In this study, I will use the framing perspective to seek to understand how cause lawyers 
contribute to the dynamic, collective process of social construction and negotiation of meaning 
that is framing. The framing perspective is a relatively promising way to access some of the 
intricacies of the cause lawyer-social movement relationship. It is a process in which cause 
lawyers play an integral role. It is a large part of what they do in the courts, just as it is a large 
part of what they do outside of court. Cause lawyers often have relatively easy access to the mass 
media and as a result are in a position to help frame the goals of the movement to the rest of the 
community. They participate in the creation of frames of collective meaning within social 
movements and independently express personal frames of understanding that unite them with 
other constituents of the movement (Jones 2003 and 2006). 
 In an early attempt to employ social movement theory in the study of cause lawyers, 
Lynn Jones (2006) introduces the phenomenon of lawyers “framing” a cause within the context 
of social movements. She summarizes what is known about this process from the perspective of 
social movements and adds to this by inserting the question of what cause lawyers contribute to 
the framing processes of social movements. She suggests that movement lawyers do not 
invariably undermine movement goals through a sole focus on litigation strategies and a one-
sided biased view of movement issues as seen through an elite profession lens. The lawyers in 
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her study play an important cooperative, internal role in the movement framing process. Through 
the movement framing lens, Jones views movement lawyers, not as outside elites, but as one type 
of movement activist. 
 Jones suggests that cause lawyers can be viewed as a category distinct from lawyers as a 
whole because of their often-divergent analysis of the legal system. The way they frame the 
system is different than the conventional lawyer. These lawyers often adopt a “haves come out 
ahead” frame that is in alignment with most movement activists’ views. This view informs the 
work that lawyers do in regard to framing the legal system for movement actors. She says that 
movement lawyers often contribute to the collective action framing process by helping frame the 
courts as benefiting the powerful, as potentially dangerous because of the potential for bad 
precedent setting, and as restricting rather than protecting rights. We will see in the data analysis 
section of this thesis that several of the respondents’ quotes suggest this type of re-framing 
function of the cause lawyer. 
I use these three core components of social movement theory, (political opportunity, 
resource mobilization, and framing), in places throughout my analysis of the data in order to 
better understand the phenomenon of cause lawyering for social movements. Although these 
components of social movement theory offer some help in understanding how lawyers fit into the 
dynamics of social movements, they do not do much to help explain political challenges and the 
effects on social movements of choices that lawyers make regarding litigation and other elements 
of their professional practice. For insight into this aspect of the social movement cause lawyering 
phenomenon I turn to key aspects of critical race theory and an analysis of a critical debate 
concerning rights discourse.   
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 Critical Race Theory 
 In conjunction with law and society scholarship and social movement theory, this 
research looks to some of the key arguments of critical race theory (CRT) as a way to understand 
issues underlying cause lawyering for social movements. CRT is a critical theory project that in 
recent decades has influenced the development of socio-legal scholarship by stirring a debate 
concerning the critique and defense of the viability of rights discourse for those seeking social 
change. In this section, I highlight the historical origins of CRT and examine some of its key 
tenets in order to demonstrate its usefulness to the study of cause lawyering. 
 In a break with traditional liberalism, the critical legal studies (CLS) movement, a 
precursor to CRT, developed as an oppositional scholarly movement in the post-civil rights era 
years in a critical response to the persistent societal hierarchies that the promise of the civil rights 
movement failed to alleviate (Crenshaw, et al. 1995). In Hutchinson and Monahan’s (1984) 
classic piece on the rise of the CLS movement, the authors show that the “CLSers” contended 
that American society in general, and specifically legal activists and social movement activists, 
maintain an unjustified faith in civil rights legislation. They argued that this blind faith 
effectively allows the hierarchies and contradictions in liberal democratic society to persist. CLS 
writers contended that these hierarchies are masked by the ideal of the “rule of law” that, instead 
of serving as a tool for liberation by correcting social imbalances, actually hides and reinforces 
these inequities. CLS scholars used this analysis to deconstruct and decidedly reject the 
possibility that law can be employed as a force of liberation. 
 The early CRT movement grew out of the critical legal studies movement, in part, as a 
reaction to the CLS rejection of rights discourse (Crenshaw, et al. 1995). CRT scholarship, as a 
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whole, does not simply reject the use of the law based on the criticisms it shares with the CLS 
movement. CRT scholars maintain, instead, that rights claiming and redress through the courts, 
in conjunction with other social movement tactics, remains one of the only viable tools available 
to historically marginalized people in their efforts towards social and economic equity (Valdes, 
Culp and Harris 2002). CRT scholars recognize the persistent inequities of the post-civil rights 
era and the shortcomings of previous attempts to achieve social equity through the courts, and 
they use this analysis to call for change in strategy, rather than a flat rejection of the utility of 
rights discourse altogether. CRT goes beyond the scope of most traditional academic scholarship 
and other critical projects in its activist dimension that seeks, not only to critically examine, 
deconstruct and understand the reality of our social condition, but also to intervene and change it 
(Crenshaw, et al. 1995). 
 CRT proposes routes by which rights discourse might be most effectively employed and 
routes by which the law might most effectively be transformed and redeemed as a tool for social 
change in conjunction with other tools of resistance. Bernie Jones (2001) summarizes the 
objectives of CRT, “The critical race theorists had as their objective ending exclusive reliance 
upon civil rights legislation, [the advancement of] storytelling to broaden public consciousness 
of racism and discrimination under the law, and protest reminiscent of the 1950s and 1960s” 
(p.1). My research seeks to examine how cause lawyers engage with social movements to 
support these types of objectives in the current political and social climate of post-Katrina New 
Orleans. Specifically, I employ this understanding of the objectives of critical race theory to 
examine whether cause lawyers adopt an unjustified blind faith in the rule of law, or whether 
cause lawyers promote the objectives that Jones identifies by strategically using but not solely 
relying upon liberal civil rights discourse, by supporting the transmission of narratives to 
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broaden public consciousness, and by encouraging more radical direct action tactics on the part 
of social movement actors. 
After a comprehensive review of CRT literature, my assessment is that the field is still 
evolving, extending to other disciplines, and absorbing internal disputes, such that it is a complex 
task to fully lay out a concise and complete picture of critical race theory. Instead, in the 
following pages, I draw upon four main tenets that underpin the objectives of critical race theory 
outlined above, which are especially useful to this study of cause lawyers and social movements. 
The first is that CRT is essentially a scholarly resistance movement, one that is dually critical of 
reformist civil rights scholarship as placing too much confidence in the rule of law, on one hand, 
and of left legal scholarship as unduly rejecting the value of rights discourse and redress through 
the courts on the other. The second aspect of CRT that is key to this research is its tendency to 
revisit and critically reinterpret historical and contemporary struggles from the perspective of the 
historically marginalized, instead of from the commonly accepted perspective of the dominant 
social group. A third aspect of CRT directly related to the second is CRT’s reliance on narrative 
and storytelling devices to bring forth the voices of the oppressed in an effort to communicate 
their experiences and activities in a way that might broaden public consciousness. And last is a 
critique of popular notions of the colorblindness and neutrality of the law. In the following pages 
I outline each of these four components of critical race theory and suggest how each contributes 
to understanding the work of left activist cause lawyers and social movements. 
First and foremost, one of the most salient qualities of the work of the critical race 
theorists is that it is a resistance movement. CRT scholars, when reflecting on the genesis of the 
movement, cite the fact that they began organizing themselves in response to the realization that 
the significant progress of the civil rights era had stalled or was even being rolled back (Delgado 
 34
and Stefancic 1995). According to Delgado and Stefancic (2001), critical legal scholars, Derrick 
Bell and Alan Freeman, produced the earliest examples of the brand critical scholarship that 
became known as CRT. They became deeply concerned with the “snail pace” at which racial 
reform was proceeding in the early post-civil rights years. They and others began to recognize in 
the 1970s that many of the early victories of the civil rights movement were already being eroded 
and that a conservative backlash against civil rights gains was mounting. This period of 
retrenchment continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s and served as a catalyst for critical legal 
scholars and others interested in similar social dynamics to develop an analysis of the entrenched 
racism, racial hierarchies and other power relationships that persist in our institutions and social 
relationships. CRT began to develop traction as a scholarly movement in these years and stirred 
controversy as these scholars worked to shed light on and challenge the practices of 
subordination performed and allowed by legal discourse and legal institutions. 
Critical race scholars created a scholarly resistance movement simultaneously engaged in 
critiques of reformist civil rights scholarship and left legal scholarship (Delgado and Stefancic 
1995). Early CRT scholars investigated whether civil rights strategies of the past could 
effectively be put to use in the post-civil rights era political climate. They contended that legal 
activism and liberal efforts for social change that focused primarily on legal remedies for formal 
equality addressed only the most overt types of racial discrimination and not the pervasive 
structures of white supremacy that are at the core of how our society is organized (Delgado and 
Stefancic 1995). In fact, these scholars argued and continue to argue that the Constitutional and 
legislative responses to overt discrimination gave rise to a popular but false belief in a “color 
blind” justice. They argue that this tendency of the courts and the general population to view the 
work of the civil rights era as “complete” makes it even more difficult to challenge the 
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underlying racial power structures that prevented significant improvement in the day to day lives 
of people of color. At the same time, they are critical of the CLS rejection of rights, because they 
recognize the power that rights discourse can offer historically marginalized people. 
One of the ways that CRT scholars engage in their resistive brand of scholarship is 
through the second element of CRT that I have identified as important to this research. CRT 
scholars present fresh views of history by reviewing and reinterpreting history through the 
framework of critical race theory rather than through the lens of the dominant social group, and 
by introducing additional historical evidence and minority perspectives that are all too often 
absent from the historical record. One famous example of this is Derrick Bell’s (2004) assertion 
that Brown v. Board of Education was actually decided in the way it was primarily because of 
international and domestic economic and political pressure, and that the real motivation behind 
the Brown decision was not some sudden shift in society toward racial justice but actually a 
move to preserve the interests of the dominant group of elite whites. This analysis highlights an 
essential problem that critical race theorists identify in the legal system that is controlled almost 
exclusively by elite whites. The problem is that changes in relationships among races, including 
the significant changes in the progressive and civil rights eras, tend to reflect the interests of the 
dominant group rather than evolving out of some idealistic or progressive sentiment (Bell 2004). 
Much of the work of CRT is in the vein of Bell’s reinterpretation in the previous passage. 
Scholars use CRT to interpret events and historical trends so that it can be shown that the dream 
of the civil rights movement has not yet been realized, that there still is work to do. In this way, 
CRT scholars situate themselves as critical interpreters and use a process of critical analysis to 
reinterpret and “shake-up” common understandings. I will show later in this thesis, in the 
analysis of respondent narratives, that interpreting is also a role of the cause lawyer who works 
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with social movement activists to critically analyze social and political contexts and broadcast 
reinterpretations that support movement objectives.  
The third element of CRT that I employ in this research is its focus on the importance of 
voice. CRT rejects the contemporary liberal tendency to assume that there is, for instance, one 
unified “Black” experience and asserts the importance of recognizing individuality and diversity 
of experience and identity in order to oppose the essentialist tendencies of our society that serve 
that conflate and marginalize voices of historical oppressed people (Valdes, Culp and Harris 
2002). But there also exists within critical race theory a simultaneously held belief that there is a 
unique voice of color that exists in “somewhat uneasy tension with anti-essentialism” (Delgado 
and Stefancic 2001). This belief in a unique voice of color is based on the notion that historically 
oppressed people of color are the only ones capable of communicating the subtleties and 
qualities of their respective histories and experiences in a way that white liberals or even the 
most sensitive, leftist, white ally could not possibly know. 
The recognition of the power of voice is one of the motivations behind the often used 
strategy within this genre of employing narrative devices and legal storytelling that highlights the 
experience of oppression. Ladson-Billings (1998) writes, “The voice component of CRT 
provides a way to communicate the experience and activities of the oppressed, a first step in 
understanding the complexities of racism and beginning a process of judicial redress” (p.56). 
Later in this thesis I will explore this notion of the importance of voice in social movements 
when I examine whether cause lawyers see part of their responsibility to the people and 
movements with which they are allied as providing a space in which their clients can formally 
voice their unique experiences.  
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In their overview of critical race theory as it had developed in the last couple of decades 
prior to their writing, Delgado and Stefancic (1995) observe that a fundamental message of the 
CRT movement is that racism is not extraordinary. It is, rather, “business as usual” in our society 
and is part of the daily struggle of people of color in this country. The fact that racism is so 
thoroughly embedded in our society makes it that much more difficult to address. Often times, 
because the racial power differential called white supremacy is the default social arrangement or 
“normal” state of affairs, that day-to-day problems associated with racial hierarchy go unseen 
especially from the perspective of the dominant group.  
Within CRT thinking is the notion that race is a social construction that has no 
biologically scientific reality. This does not mean, however, that race is not important to social 
reality. CRT claims that clearly race is crucial, because of how racialization is experienced by 
members of society (Valdes, Culp and Harris 2002). The notion of race as a social construction is 
becoming more and more accepted across society, but this notion is also being abused by 
dominant groups to maintain the hierarchical status quo.  The argument is repeated at all levels 
of society that if race is a social construction and fundamentally unreal, then we should not 
consider it in our institutions or social relations. But, as CRT theorists would argue, this 
argument ignores the contextual reality of how race is experienced socially.  CRT theorists 
recognize race as a social construction but advocate for a “race conscious” view of social 
relations and institutions. 
These arguments concerning entrenched every-day racism and calls for race-
consciousness in social relations and institutions culminate in a fourth major theme flowing 
throughout the CRT literature. I identify this fourth component as a critique of the brand of 
liberalism that believes in colorblindness and the neutrality of law. In the view of many CRT 
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scholars, these liberal political views have allowed for interventions in only the most overt types 
of formal racist discrimination and tied the hands of those who would do more to substantially 
address racial inequality in America (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 1995; 
Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Valdes, Culp and Harris 2002; Bell 2004). CRT scholars put 
forward that only aggressive color-conscious action can effect change in racial hierarchy. CRT 
scholars suggest that this action should be rooted in and balanced between aggressive rights-
based litigation and forms of social protest that allow the voices of those struggling for justice to 
be heard. 
The CRT approach to the role of the law and the value of rights claiming is likely more in 
line with the beliefs, values, and struggles of cause lawyers and social movements than is the 
liberal view of rights claiming as the key to liberation or the CLS view of the impotence of 
rights. These lawyers and movement leaders generally appear to maintain a degree of critical 
skepticism regarding rights and the promise of rights discourse to directly effect substantive 
social change, but they do advocate for strategically using rights discourse to formally address 
the persistent inequities in the American social structure. The four elements of critical race 
theory highlighted in this section help to specifically focus this research on similar issues that 
arise in the study of cause lawyers and social movements.   
The Utility of the Law for Social Change  
 
A crucial debate joining together the fields of social movement scholarship and legal 
scholarship revolves around the question of whether the law can be mobilized to bring about 
social change. Two contrasting books published in the 1990s typify this debate and employ case 
study methodology and historical analysis in an effort to address this basic question. Viewed 
alongside each other, an analysis of their competing claims will help situate this research relative 
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to this important question. In the following pages, I review these works in some depth to offer 
some historical context in which to situate a central question of this research. A close look at this 
debate bolsters this research by more fully laying out what the real challenge is to litigation from 
the social movement perspective. 
Both Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change? 
(1991) and Michael McCann’s Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal 
Mobilization (1994) employ case study methodology to deeply investigate the question at hand, 
but interestingly, the two arrive at starkly different conclusions about the role of the law and, 
specifically, rights discourse and its effect on efforts for social change. Rosenberg’s ultimate 
assessment is that the courts are not equipped or inclined to be the harbingers of meaningful 
social change. McCann, on the other hand, argues that legal tactics, as one facet of a robust 
social movement, can be an effective tool. He makes a vital contribution by identifying more 
subtle, but no less important, ways in which legal action and discourse are important to 
movements. 
Rosenberg examines the United States Supreme Court’s efficacy in the production of 
social change by exploring case studies of the civil rights movement through the lens of Brown v. 
Board of Education and the women’s rights movement with a focus on Roe v. Wade. His analysis 
paints a picture of courts that ultimately lack the capacity to create meaningful change, except on 
the rare occasion when a number of essential conditions coincide to allow significant 
constraining factors to be overcome. He claims that judicially upheld rights of claimants do very 
little to create sweeping social change for subordinated groups. In fact, Rosenberg views 
litigation primarily as a liability to social movements as it diverts resources and movement 
attention away from more potentially fertile paths aimed at social reform. 
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Rosenberg sees the important successes of these movements as being produced primarily 
by the non-legal political action of the movements with which the courts then had to catch up. He 
concludes that, instead of being the harbingers of change, the court cases of Brown and Roe fell 
into line with the political, economic, and social changes that were already occurring in society.  
Although Rosenberg’s investigation of the direct results of court rulings is appealing because of 
its straightforward empirical nature, it seems to fall short of considering the social complexities 
of how legal forms are employed in the work of social movements (i.e. the power that rights 
claiming provides by energizing and mobilizing a movement.) This is where Michael McCann’s 
work adds to the discussion and encourages those concerned with the question of the impact of 
the law on social movements to dig a bit deeper and to not write-off legal mobilization so 
quickly as a misguided approach to effecting social change. 
 McCann focuses on a systematic analysis of the gender-based pay equity reform 
movement to arrive at very different conclusion than does Rosenberg. One of the reasons that his 
conclusion is different is that he conceptualizes the question differently. McCann broadens his 
view of the impact of the law on social movements beyond a top-down investigation of the direct 
effects of court decisions to a bottom-up view of how legal forms, including rights claiming, 
operate in the social world to benefit movement goals. He develops a legal mobilization 
framework through which he examines the role of the law in four stages of social movement 
trajectory: movement building, the struggle to compel formal policy change, the struggle to 
control the process of policy reform, and the transformative legacy of legal action. He claims that 
the evidence shows that at these various stages legal mobilization can be both a restricting factor 
and a resource for achieving goals. His analysis includes an investigation of the contextual 
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factors of when, where, and to what degree legal mobilization is more or less effective as a tool 
for social change. 
McCann concludes that legal mobilization is not, in and of itself, sufficient to effect 
massive social change. Rather, McCann realizes that the law can be more or less effectively 
mobilized in the interest of movement goals based upon the relative robustness of other 
movement resources. McCann argues that legal forms are important to social movements in ways 
that are more subtle, but no less important, than a straightforward consideration of success in the 
courtroom and direct effects of judicial rulings can reveal. 
A problematic aspect of Rosenberg’s analysis is his primary focus on direct judicial 
effects of legal mobilization at the expense of seriously considering the deep importance that 
extra-legal effects may provide to causes. Extra-legal effects of legal mobilization might include 
other goals of organizing, consciousness raising and community building. His methods are 
designed to find causal relationships between court action and numerous possible extra-legal 
effects. Given the complexity of social reality, such causal relationships are nearly impossible to 
draw. Rosenberg concedes this when he writes “social scientists do not understand fully the 
myriad of factors that are involved in an individual’s reaching a political decision…[so] it is 
simply impossible to state with certainty that the Court did or did not produce significant social 
reform in civil rights” (p. 108). 
Because of the nature of these extra-legal effects, they are often difficult to measure, so 
claims of causal relationships between legal action and social change become even more difficult 
to assert. Rosenberg briefly acknowledges this and warns that, ultimately, his finding of little to 
no evidence suggesting extra-judicial influence requires that his assessment remain uncertain. 
But this is problematic because much of his conclusion is based on the assertion that not only 
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were direct social effects of court action limited but that the extra-judicial effects were also 
negligible. Rosenberg looked for these extra-judicial effects in news media reports, public 
opinion polls, and the action of elites. He did not look for evidence where it would most likely 
have been found, in the words and actions of movement activists, which would have been a 
better measure of the real but subtle effects in the everyday lives of those struggling for change. 
McCann fills this gap with a bottom-up analysis that takes more seriously the possible 
advantages that legal mobilization has for individuals, movement momentum, and the ultimate 
progress toward movement goals.  
McCann’s systematic analysis of the role of law in the gender-based pay equity reform 
movement provides particularly useful insight into the question of the utility of the law as a tool 
for social movements. McCann writes that he began his study of the movement convinced of the 
plausibility of the prevalent scholarly interpretation of the limited and limiting role of legal 
mobilization in social movements (p.3). This view, voiced by many critical legal scholars, 
contends that litigation and legal tactics are at best severely limited in their ability to effect 
meaningful social change for marginalized groups; and even worse, legal tactics may be a waste 
of valuable movement resources towards an end that may prove to be at odds with ultimate 
movement goals. Generally stated, this is also the view that Rosenberg advocates and the view 
that McCann started with. But the evidence that McCann uncovered in his research on the pay 
equity reform movement forced him to rethink his intellectual stance on the role of the law in 
social movements. 
The perspective advanced by McCann “affirms a critical commitment to documenting the 
important ways in which legal mobilization plays a limited and limiting role in social movement 
politics” (p.12). But at the same time it also questions the prime focus that much of the critical 
 43
legal scholarship places on the law as a purely hegemonic, co-opting force. McCann contends 
that each of these views are valid at different times, in different contexts, to different degrees. 
The framework that he presents is based on a vision of the law that is not really an exclusive 
force in and of itself, but is rather one dimension of social practice that is as indeterminate, 
complex, multidimensional, and as dependent on context as is the rest of our social world. The 
legal mobilization framework developed here conceives of law as neither just a resource nor just 
a constraint for those who wish to take action for social change. Instead, it turns attention to 
understanding how, when, and to what degree law tends to be both at once. 
McCann identifies and investigates four stages of movement activity in search of the 
different ways in which legal forms are mobilized and their varying impacts in the life cycle of a 
social movement. After investigating the initial movement building stage of the pay equity 
struggle, McCann’s assessment is that legal advocacy has been more of a positive force than a 
detrimental one. He attends to the effective uses of litigation and other legal strategy to raise 
consciousness of the issue in a way that brought pay equity discourse into the public sphere and 
provided a catalyst for growth of the movement. He describes “court decisions and legal forms 
[as] not self-generating forces of defiant action. Rather, they constitute only political resources 
that may or may not be mobilized in practical action” (p.91). He concludes that lawyers, 
litigation, and legal discourse, while not the primary force of early stage movement development, 
did nevertheless serve as an important resource in the building of the movement. 
The study shows how the initial although modest court victories in the early stages of the 
movement provided a “jump-start” to a movement that had for some time been struggling for 
legitimacy outside of the spotlight. The result of these initial court victories should not be 
interpreted as evidence for litigation being the “cause” of an emergent social movement. Rather, 
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it provided hope and inspiration to movement activists who had long been struggling and it 
raised awareness of the issues and affirmed the validity of rights consciousness so that others 
were drawn to participate in movement activities. 
Critical legal scholars often claim that legal action disempowers movement activists and 
decreases democratic participation in movement politics. McCann’s study suggests the opposite. 
In fact, his research provides evidence that top-down, elite-dominated, local movement actions 
typically involved little or no legal action, whereas the most bottom-up examples of grassroots 
participatory action were accompanied in their early stages by lawsuits at the local level. 
Winning in court often became a way to build movement membership to engage in other forms 
of political action rather than an alternative to grassroots political action. Although he concludes 
that legal mobilization had a general positive effect on early movement development, it is 
important to emphasize that McCann noted a wide-ranging degree of variability between 
settings, and that where this did work, it only worked for a limited time. 
Just as legal tactics can contribute to building early-stage movement participation and 
momentum, so too can it be used as a tool in what McCann conceives as the second and third 
stages of movement activity, the struggle to compel concessions from the dominant groups 
(managers, unsupportive politicians, private employers, etc.) and the struggle to gain control of 
the policy-use of the law as a leverage tool so as to not necessarily require victory in court or 
even going to court at all. The pay equity movement shows that the mere potential for judicial 
intervention and the power of rights discourse among movement activists and other players in the 
struggle can provide potent resources for social movements. Actual or potential litigation can 
subtly shift power relationships to allow for “bargaining in the shadow of the law” (p.140).  
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In this way, McCann’s analysis suggests the importance of broadening the focus of the 
effects of legal mobilization from merely an analysis of formal legal processes to understanding 
how legal discourse as a social phenomenon is informally employed behind-the-scenes as a 
resource in the development of a movement and in the resolution of social conflicts. This 
broadened view is especially important given the compelling evidence that movement activists 
commonly understand litigation as a potentially powerful tool of last resort. McCann says that 
tactical use of legal leveraging in concert with other negotiation strategies has been a prevalent 
strategy in the pay equity reform movement. Early court victories empowered movement 
activists to be able to force negotiations with the threat of further legal action. Through a 
systematic examination of the collective bargaining process McCann presents a view of “the law 
as a club” by which concessions by employers can sometimes be compelled.  
This general positive view is qualified by evidence that the tactic of trying to force 
concessions by elites through threat of litigation can be uncertain and risky. There exist clear 
limitations and costs. McCann’s examination of numerous local cases reveals that the positive 
impact varied. In some cases, legal action was clearly the most important factor throughout the 
struggle to compel concessions. In other cases, legal action was important only for a limited 
time. In still other cases, legal tactics were crucial but only in indirect ways.  And even more 
significant, but less common than the previous scenarios, is the one in which legal action 
produced only very minimal concessions (i.e. unsubstantial wage improvements for some 
workers and a commitment from employers to “study” the problem.) The reasons for these 
variations are complex, but this particular study identifies the following three key factors.  
One important factor is the shift in the courts in the mid to late 1980s at the height of the 
movement towards being less receptive to the idea of comparable worth and wage discrimination 
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claims. A second factor of variability involves the resolve and capacity of opponents. Private 
institutions were much more likely to go to great lengths to oppose wage reform efforts than 
were public sector employers. The final factor identified by McCann that affects the tendency for 
legal mobilization to be able to effect concessions is the overall strategic strength of the larger 
movement. None of the local struggles studied by McCann used legal tactics, or any other tactic 
for that matter, exclusively. Legal tactics are most successful when employed at the right time, in 
the right context, in concert with a host of other strategies (bargaining, legislative lobbying, 
media tactics, striking, mass demonstration, etc.) None of these tactics is sufficient on its own. 
Thus legal tactics have proved less successful in localized struggles in which these other tactics 
are ineffectively employed. 
McCann’s prime contribution is his identification of a gap in the scholarship regarding 
serious inquiry into the many indirect effects of reform litigation and devotes much of his 
analysis towards illuminating the importance to social movements of legal discourse outside of 
courtrooms. Much of the scholarship on the effectiveness of the law as a tool for social change 
has involved skepticism about the value of the courts as a resource for social movements based 
on the two related but distinct critical claims that courts are poorly organized to develop and 
administer social policy and that courts lack the coercive resources necessary to impose changes 
in social relations and practices (p.177). McCann believes that these low estimates of the 
influence of legal mechanisms, although based on empirical evidence, are faulty because they are 
too narrowly conceived and do not consider the broader social contexts in which legal norms, 
rights discourse and judicial signals produce “radiating effects” from which social movements 
can gain considerable political capital.  
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 In the debate over the utility of the law for social change that is typified by the McCann-
Rosenberg debate we can locate a key issue at the core of this thesis research. My assessment of 
this debate is similar to my assessment of the CLS/CRT debate about rights discourse. I find the 
ultimate rejection of legal mechanisms and rights discourse by critics such as Rosenberg and 
CLS scholars to be faulty and short-sighted. They develop an appropriately critical framework of 
analysis but stop short of the more nuanced perspectives of McCann and CRT that appear more 
closely attuned to the real experiences of people involved in real struggles who experience legal 
mechanisms and rights discourse as both constraining and empowering. 
 48
Chapter 4: Design and Methods 
 
Overall Approach and Rationale 
 The intricacy of the social world under consideration in this research suggests numerous 
compelling perspectives from which it would be possible to uncover layers of complexity in this 
study. But in order to have a meaningful, manageable, focused study, it is necessary to settle on a 
locus of interest or unit of analysis through which the study can be conducted. Although it will 
be important throughout this study to view the social phenomenon of interest from a variety of 
angles (micro, macro, organizational, individual), this study will take as the primary unit of 
analysis individuals and their lived experiences and perceptions.  
 Because my research interests are focused on the complexity of social interaction 
expressed in daily life and on the meanings that the participants attach to these interactions I 
made an initial determination that a qualitative approach to this research would be most fruitful. 
Rossman and Rallis (2003) offer five characteristics of qualitative research that are well suited to 
approach the questions posed in this research.  They say that qualitative research (a) takes place 
in the natural world, (b) uses multiple interactive and humanistic methods, (c) focuses on 
context, (d) is emergent and evolving, and (e) is fundamentally interpretive. A range of 
qualitative research methodologies were then explored to discover which might be best suited to 
capture the specific type of information sought by this study. I decided to base this research 
primarily in the genre of phenomenological studies through which the lived experience of a small 
number of people is investigated to understand the deep meaning of a person’s experience and 
how individuals articulate this experience and integrate the meaning into their lives (Rossman 
and Rallis 2003). The process of in-depth phenomenological interviewing to be used in this study 
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will closely follow the methodology developed by Seidman (1998). A description of this process 
and how it will be applied in this research is provided in the Data Gathering Procedures section.  
Population Selection and Sampling Strategies 
This research is designed to be a study of a particular kind of population and a particular 
phenomenon. The population of interest consists of cause lawyers working in conjunction with 
social justice movements. The phenomenon of interest is the way in which cause lawyers 
conceive of and negotiate the challenges unique to lawyering for social justice movements. This 
research focuses on the cause lawyer as the primary unit of analysis in order to gain access to the 
deep meaning of their work and how they experience their side of the relationship between 
lawyers and social movements. 
Particularly, this research focuses on cause lawyers in post-Katrina New Orleans working 
for a variety of social justice causes. Broadly conceived, these issues include environmental 
justice concerns, public and affordable housing, the right to return of displaced people, workers’ 
rights, and other issues critical to a just recovery. Instead of focusing on one lawyer or a group 
lawyers working on a single issue I determined that a richer understanding would be achieved by 
taking a broader view of lawyers working in support of social justice movements. This allows a 
broader range of experience and perspective from a larger field of potential informants than 
might be available with a more narrow focus. This benefit of a broadly focused view of multiple 
causes had to be balanced with the risk that it might prove too broad and imprecisely focused. 
The soundness of the choice was affirmed time after time during the interview process, during 
which the respondents self-identified as a bounded group. The respondents revealed that they 
conceive of themselves and their work as being intertwined in a network of others as part of a 
broadly defined “movement” for social justice in post-Katrina New Orleans. 
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I selected potential informants on the basis of several criteria for inclusion and exclusion. 
The potential respondent pool was initially developed by searching for lawyers who live and 
work in New Orleans who clearly fit into the category of cause lawyer as conceived by law and 
society scholars. These lawyers are distinct from conventional lawyers in a number of ways. 
They choose to devote themselves to the interest of specific causes, often at personal, political, 
and financial expense. They are primarily motivated to engage in work that will advance their 
vision of a more just society. The cause lawyers in this study assist people and groups that 
traditionally have difficulty in finding lawyers for political and financial reasons. They challenge 
the prevailing conceptions of professionalism that stress neutrality and distance. Cause lawyers 
as a conceptual category devote themselves to serving causes across the political spectrum. This 
study was delimited by focusing on left-activist lawyers working in the context of a post-Katrina 
self-determination movement for a just recovery.  
I originally gained entrée to this population of cause lawyers through my volunteer work 
in support of the grassroots relief effort to promote a more just recovery from the effects of 
Hurricane Katrina. In this work I developed a relationship with a social justice lawyer engaged in 
support of the grassroots organization for which I was working. This lawyer in many ways 
exemplifies the cause lawyer model and became a significant informant in the initial stage of this 
research. This initial contact provided a bridge to other potential respondents by recommending 
and facilitating contact with others involved in similar work. These other lawyers were also 
asked to recommend other potential contacts based on my description of the population I wanted 
to access.  In this way, a pool of potential participants grew through a “snowball sampling” 
method in which study participants recommended other potential information rich cases of 
interest (Marshall and Rossman 2006). 
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This method of snowball sampling proved to be very reliable way to build a pool from 
which study participants could be selected. There was a lot of commonality in the 
recommendations. In fact, it became apparent through this initial referral process, and even more 
so in the in-depth interviews, that there exists in New Orleans a small community of cause 
lawyers who all know each other in one way or another and frequently work together on various 
causes. This provided further evidence that I had tapped into what could be seen as a bounded 
group of cause lawyers working in support of social justice issues in New Orleans.  
This initial survey of the population yielded fifteen lawyers who could possibly qualify 
for this study. In my initial phone and email correspondence with these potential respondents I 
described my research interests and gathered some basic information about work history, what 
type of lawyering they do, how they conceive their roles and how connected they were to social 
movement dynamics in post-Katrina New Orleans. Of these fifteen, I eliminated two who, 
although supportive of several of the causes that to which other respondents are committed, 
maintain much more conventional practices and perform a bit of social justice support work on 
the side. These did not seem to represent the population of committed cause lawyers that I sought 
and so I eliminated them as potential subjects. I identified and invited thirteen potential 
respondents to participate in the interview process. Scheduling of the interviews with the 
remaining thirteen potential respondents proved to be especially challenging with this group of 
exceptionally busy lawyers committed to causes around which there was often an element of 
impending crisis to which they had to attend. Of this of pool thirteen, I was eventually able to 
complete interviews with ten respondents who exemplify the category of cause lawyer and are 
meaningfully involved in social movement processes. These ten became the subjects for this 
study.  
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Demographic Background Summary of the Respondents 
Although each of these lawyers fits within the conceptual category of cause lawyer, and 
although the analysis of their discourse will reveal that they share many interests and values, the 
respondents are actually quite a diverse group with varying backgrounds, identities, specialties, 
and levels of experience. I will present some demographic description here in order to provide 
the reader with some understanding of the ten respondents whose narratives form the core of this 
research. 
As a group, the respondents are very well rooted in the New Orleans community. Eight of 
the ten were residents of New Orleans pre-Katrina. Of these, half were born and raised in New 
Orleans. The four non-native, pre-Katrina residents have lived in New Orleans for ten to twenty-
nine years. One of the two who were not living in New Orleans at the time of Katrina was born 
and raised in New Orleans and decided to return to her hometown to support the relief efforts 
immediately after the storm. The other came to New Orleans for the first time immediately after 
Katrina as a law student to offer legal support and decided to make a permanent move and start 
her legal career in the city after graduation from law school. 
The group consists of two black females in their late thirties and early forties; four white 
females, with ages fairly evenly distributed from early twenties to early fifties; one black male in 
his early thirties; and three white males, one in his mid-forties, one in his late fifties, and one in 
his late sixties. These age ranges came fairly close to spanning the length of a typical career with 
the majority of the respondents falling into the mid-career range. 
Characterizing the respondents by the type of law that they do is slightly more 
challenging than is the case for these other demographic categories. This is because several are 
involved in a number of overlapping areas of the law. And, in fact, most self-identify more 
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readily with descriptors such as community lawyer, social justice lawyer, civil rights lawyer, or 
human rights lawyer than with strict areas of the law or single causes. Most indicated that more 
important than their specialty is their orientation toward being a social justice cause lawyer. 
Nonetheless, some do focus more on a certain type of law than others. Two are environmental 
justice lawyers. Four are most commonly known as civil rights lawyers. They deal with such 
issues as access to healthcare, affordable and public housing, access to public education, 
workers’ rights, voting rights and criminal justice defense. Two deal rather exclusively with 
affordable housing and housing discrimination issues. One works mostly on juvenile justice 
reform and one advocates primarily for adults faced with the possibility of, or already sentenced 
to, death by execution. This provides the reader with some background as to what type of law the 
respondents are involved in, but it is important to note that they more closely identify with 
advocating for social justice than they do with any particular specialty area of the law. Three 
were involved in grassroots movements as social justice activists prior to going to law school. 
The other seven say that they were motivated to find a career in which they could be active 
forces in social change and chose the law for that reason and entered into the world of social 
movement through the role of lawyer. 
Data Gathering Procedures 
This research relies on semi-structured, in-depth interviews with cause lawyers as the key 
informants.  These interviews are designed to explore personal life histories relative to the topic, 
specific details of the participants’ experiences, and participants’ reflections on the meaning of 
their experiences. 
A pool of potential informants was established through a “snowball sampling” method in 
which potential informants identified other potential information rich cases of interest (Marshall 
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and Rossman 2006). Individuals in this pool were screened to establish whether or not they could 
appropriately be included in the sample group. Thirteen potential respondents were identified 
and invited to participate. I successfully completed interviews with ten. 
I adopted a modified version of the phenomenological interview format advocated by 
Seidman (1998).  Seidman recommends a series of three in-depth, iterative interviews, each with 
a specific purpose. It became apparent early in the interview scheduling process that my 
informants were not able to make themselves available for three separate interviews on three 
different occasions, so I chose to modify and collapse the preferred model into one longer 
interview while maintaining the essential structure of three segments, each with a specific focus. 
The first part of the interview inquired into the interviewee’s history and life story relative to the 
research topic. The second part of the interview oriented the researcher and the interviewee to the 
specific details of phenomenon of interest. The third part of the interview is designed to create a 
reflexive dialogue about the meaning of the interviewee’s experience. These interviews were 
open-ended, semi-structured, conversational interviews designed to elicit rich descriptions, deep 
interpretations, and critical self-reflections. This raw narrative data was then transcribed, 
aggregated and coded and then analyzed through appropriate theoretical frameworks and related 
to what was already known in order to determine its particular correlation to the scholarship on 
lawyering for social change. 
Procedures for Analysis 
 I began the formal process of data analysis by meticulously transcribing the full audio 
recording of each interview. This resulted in 104 pages of text and proved to be more than just a 
tedious process; it was fruitful in that the transcribing process allowed for an initial review of 
each interview during which I invariably noticed bits of significant information that I had missed 
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in the actual interview. As I got deeper into the transcribing process patterns began to suggest 
themselves, but I was conscious not to jump to conclusions and prematurely form rigid notions 
about the emerging themes of the lawyers’ discourse. 
 I then made an initial reading of each completed transcript to identify, mark and label 
significant passages. Some of these labels related directly to the major threads of the conceptual 
framework of this research or concepts that were brought forward in my review of the literature. 
But I was also conscious of allowing new observations and insights to emerge from the text that 
could suggest new labels. I reread and refined these emergent categories. This coding process 
enabled a formal representation of a number of categories. Several interesting and unexpected 
categories presented themselves in this process, some of which were relevant to this research and 
reported on in the findings section of this thesis. Other categories emerged that were deemed less 
directly relevant and were set aside and not included in this report. I then collected the passages 
that constituted the most relevant categories for a further level of analysis in which I looked for 
themes within and between categories. I then experimented with various ways of organizing 
these themes into a conceptual scheme and eventually selected one that offers a way of filtering 
and interpreting the copious amounts of data that the respondents provided in a way that can shed 
some light on the research question. These themes and conceptual schemes are presented along 
with my interpretations in chapter five.
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Chapter 5: Findings and Interpretation 
 
Introduction 
The interviews with cause lawyers that serve as the basis of this study contain stories of 
lawyering for social movements. These stories provide the perspectives of cause lawyers in the 
process of reflecting and thinking critically about their work in the interest of social justice 
movements. In these interviews it was clear that the respondents wanted to dispel myths and shed 
light on the reality of what it is to work in their capacity to support social justice causes. Clearly, 
the project of illuminating the complexities of their work has a certain salience for them. When 
asked to talk about their work, respondents were eager to discuss the complexities, challenges, 
successes and rewards of working on social justice campaigns.  
Respondents communicated their particular understandings of their roles within the 
broadly defined social movements in which they work by what they said and how they said it. In 
the first level of analysis, I identified conceptual categories contained in the narratives of the 
respondents such as the following: 
• Early experiences with activism 
• Significant role models 
• Problems with law school pedagogy 
Some common themes arose from an analysis of well more than a dozen categories of 
data of which the above three are merely examples. The resultant themes form substantive units 
to which I have ascribed names based on how respondents define these dimensions of cause 
lawyering. The six substantive themes that emerge most clearly from this analysis are:  
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1) Expressions of the limitations of legal advocacy  
2) The work of relationships 
3) Feeling situated within a movement 
4) Alternative measures of success 
5) Ameliorating symptoms versus addressing root causes  
6) Expanding notions of professional and political responsibilities.  
I describe each substantive theme below and provide a fuller examination and interpretation of 
each theme in the section that follows this initial introduction. 
Developing the Substantive Themes 
An important aspect of the narratives of the cause lawyers comes in the form of the 
lawyers’ perceptions of the limitations, negative side effects and contested notions of the promise 
that legal mechanisms might offer to those seeking social justice. These accounts of measured 
skepticism coalesce to form a theme that I simply named expressions of the limitations of legal 
advocacy. These lawyers’ reflections of the limitations of legal advocacy begin to explain some 
of the other categories of meaning explored in this analysis. For instance, the limitations of legal 
advocacy theme clearly helps explain why cause lawyers seek a more expansive professional 
role than that of a traditional lawyer. This, in turn, allows for broader means by which they can 
claim success in their work. The limitations of traditional lawyering models also suggest one 
reason that cause lawyers seek out relationships in many facets of their work. These relationships 
help situate their work within a larger movement. And this adds a dimension of meaning to their 
work that would be absent without this felt embeddedness. This expressed feeling of being 
connected to movement actors and embedded within a movement leads to the next thematic 
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category of this analysis that discusses the importance of relationships in the lives of cause 
lawyers. 
The work of relationships category presents a prominent theme in the discourse of the 
respondents. This particular category emerged early on in the coding process as I observed a 
strikingly high frequency of statements concerning collaboration, descriptions of coalition 
building processes, feelings of solidarity with clients and other movement participants, the 
negotiation of power dynamics in these relationships and the overall primary role that 
relationships play in the lives of cause lawyers. This theme is represented by a higher number of 
passages within respondent narratives than any of the other themes and is named the “work” of 
relationships to point out the active role that relationships play in the work of the cause lawyer. 
This thematic category contains a wealth of data concerning issues such as what motivates cause 
lawyers and the qualitative aspects of how they engage in their work with social justice 
movements. 
 This focus on relationships allows a glimpse into the process of how lawyers become 
socially situated in a larger movement. This perspective leads fluidly to a discussion of the 
discrete but related theme of feeling situated within a movement. Within this thematic category, I 
assemble passages from respondents that relay their understandings of their role within a larger 
movement. This theme offers examples of how this “situatedness” benefits the cause lawyer and 
the movement as a whole. The respondents offer various descriptions of how they experience 
themselves and their legal work as just one piece, and not necessarily the most important piece, 
of a robust social movement.  
The category of alternative measures of success contains expressions of the relatively 
sophisticated, alternative means of measuring the success of their work and the success of the 
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movement as a whole. Into this category, I placed statements concerning the inadequacy of 
defining success by the standards of traditional lawyering and statements containing descriptions 
of why and how these lawyers find alternative ways to measure success. When viewed in the 
aggregate, these lawyers are clearly focused on objectives such as community empowerment and 
other broad goals of social justice. And since empowerment and justice-seeking are inherently 
political activities this category sheds light on the inherently political nature of deciding what 
counts as “success.” 
There are many tensions and complexities that reveal themselves as sub-themes of the 
previous and following thematic categories. These are appropriately discussed within the context 
of the other themes in this analysis. But my analysis of the data also revealed one tension that 
was a pronounced enough aspect of the discourse to warrant a category unto itself. Featuring 
prominently in the interviews is a fundamental tension between problem solving for individuals 
and the sometimes competing dual focus of pursuing broader movement goals of widespread 
institutional or societal change through policy reform. The respondents described various ways 
of understanding and dealing with this issue, but nearly all contribute in some form to the 
development of the collective category that I named ameliorating symptoms versus addressing 
root causes. 
Ultimately, despite their measured skepticism in the ultimate promise of legal 
mechanisms, these lawyers cautiously accept legal advocacy as a valid part of a broad struggle 
for social change. At the same time, they adapt their practices to reflect their beliefs about the 
political implications of the various challenges of cause lawyering for social justice movements. 
They share ways in which their efforts to negotiate these challenges have led them to develop 
their practices around the major themes that serve as the focus of this analysis. This leads them to 
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expand their notions of what lawyering means in the context in which they do it. They have 
developed models for lawyering and engaging with social movements that extend beyond 
traditional lawyering roles. Some even describe a professional role that they have adopted that, at 
times, more closely resembles the role of community organizer than the traditional lawyer. These 
ideas are presented and explored as a category that I name expanding notions of professional and 
political responsibilities. 
These substantive themes prove to be a useful way to categorize what respondents are 
generally saying about the meaning that they attach to their work. Presenting respondents’ 
discussions of the thematic issues only gives an overview of the respondents’ understanding of 
the phenomena. In the following pages of this chapter, I present each theme and respondents’ 
expressions of them in order to access another level of analysis in which I search for the deeper 
meanings in the negotiation of the tensions within the work of the cause lawyer. 
Expressions of the limitations of legal advocacy 
One of the questions that motivates this research is whether or not cause lawyers 
approach their chosen profession with an unreasonable degree of faith in the tendency of the 
court system to be a harbinger or even a major player in efforts for substantive social change. 
Analysis of the respondents’ discourse on this issue supports the claim they actually have 
developed through experience, measured, qualified degrees of faith in the role of the courts in 
issuing changes on the issues on which they work. In this section, I present an overview and 
discussion of what cause lawyers identify as limiting factors that make the courts less than 
optimally effective vehicles of change. In addition to these, the lawyers offer a few examples of 
what they see as serious negative impacts on social movements that certain legal action on their 
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behalf can sometimes produce. I also examine what the informants say about how they deal with 
this reality in their work with social movements. 
Within this theme of how cause lawyers understand the relative limitations of legal 
advocacy for social movements there exist minor sub-themes that I highlight in this section to 
give an overview of the broad theme. One is that cause lawyers recognize a widespread belief in 
a “myth of rights” that encourages people to rely too much upon the utility of the courts to effect 
change. Out of this I draw forth another sub-theme of the role of cause lawyers as framers within 
a collective action framing perspective. Cause lawyers sometimes participate in the framing 
process by helping movement actors manage expectations for success in court by framing the 
courts as being less than optimally effective. There is also a sub-theme evident here of cause 
lawyers as assessors of political opportunity who help movement activists recognize when the 
political opportunity structure is likely to be inhospitable to their legal claims. In this scenario, 
the cause lawyer often becomes active in searching out alternative forms of professional practice 
that allow the cause lawyer to support political action designed to enable other elements of the 
social movement better situated to take better advantage of the current structure of political 
opportunity. 
A couple of the respondents spoke directly about the “myth” that entices people, 
especially non-lawyers, to place an undue amount of confidence in the legal system to right 
social wrongs. Respondent E says that he is frequently approached by people from the 
community or local or national advocates for social justice causes who want his help to file some 
sort of formal legal action to seek redress for some social problem that they recognize. He says,  
Most of the time I tell them it is a myth that the courts are the place that you go to get 
justice. People who are not lawyers, even though they haven’t necessarily gotten any 
justice for themselves in this way think, “Gee, if we could file suit, that would do it.” 
…and the reality is that it’s not like that at all.   
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He goes on to say that often his role as attorney is not to aggressively file and pursue lawsuits but 
to help people adjust their expectations, or even to convince them that a lawsuit would be bad 
because it diverts attention from other avenues through which grievances might be more 
efficiently redressed. He says that often a court case can “give the City Council or…all these 
other people a way just to say, ‘Hey it’s in the courts now, we’ll just have to wait and see what 
happens.’” And when a court case is being pursued he says that part of his job is to make sure 
that other people involved in the movement continue to push for change at other levels and that 
they don’t rely too heavily on narrow prospects for change coming out of the courts. Respondent 
E says, “part of the problem of the lawyer is to constantly help people adjust their expectations. 
You know, this judge didn’t become a judge by being a spokesperson for social justice or by 
sticking his neck out all the time.” Respondent F talks about his belief that advocacy consists of 
much more than just litigation:  
I mean, I’m a lawyer and I know how to litigate and do that stuff, but as an advocate I 
realize that litigation has some serious limits and takes a lot of time and a lot of energy 
and usually a lot of money…. And so that’s why I try not to do it so much myself if I can 
avoid it, because I think that advocacy is a much larger thing than just litigation. It is also 
about brainstorming with people about what their options are. 
 
In these examples we see the possibility that these cause lawyers, rather than prescribing legal 
solutions to all problems, are often critical of prospects in the court and recommend or help 
search out alternative or broader, concurrent strategies for action around the causes they support. 
 Related to Respondent E’s warning to movement activists about the conservative nature 
of the courts are a number of other cautionary statements from cause lawyers that indicate a 
pattern of measured skepticism concerning the use of the courts by those seeking social change. 
One is that the courts are political in nature and in recent years have become more conservative 
in some ways that certainly affect how the courts might best be strategically engaged with by 
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social movement lawyers. This observation mirrors scholarly observations of shifts in recent 
decades in the American popular consciousness, and reflected in the courts, of an increasingly 
unsupportive context for rights-based legally oriented social movement activity (Rosenberg 
1990; McCann and Dudas 2006). Respondent D says that,  
…there has been a withering away of people’s abilities to have private rights of action to 
sue in federal court on broad basis or sometimes even on an individual basis. And you 
know, that has happened over the last ten years or so. So that that right of action has been 
gradually chipped, chipped, chipped away. And it’s been kind of quietly done and most 
folks…[when] you get to the point that you think, “Hey, I really need to sue about this 
issue,” You may find yourself kind of wiped out of the system now because of some of 
these court decisions that have come down over these past few years. 
 
She follows this statement with an explanation that, without this right to sue, individuals and 
grassroots groups often must rely on the Housing Authority or the School Board or some other 
agency to rectify the situation for which a remedy is sought. This lawyer feels that this is the 
level on which social movement pressure is in the current political context most effectively 
applied. In her work she actually tries to focus on building non-adversarial relationships with 
individuals who work at the local administrative agency level in an effort to try to effect change 
without having to go to court. 
 Respondent D also points out that her way of working more closely with the institutions 
of “the establishment” doesn’t mean that she is less committed to working towards meaningful 
change in lives of those for whom she works. In fact, she believes that on average she finds more 
success in her mode of engaging in the struggle than those who take a more adversarial 
approach. She says, “…the courts are not necessarily the best way to go in the environment that 
we live in now.  You know the old saying ‘Justice delayed is justice denied.’” Respondent D 
goes on to explain that often a lawsuit results in entrenchment and refusal to negotiate from the 
other side.  And the judicial process is so slow that she often she finds it hard to explain to her 
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individual clients or the grassroots groups with whom she works that, even if they win, they may 
not receive the relief they seek because of the slow process of trials and appeals that sometimes 
takes years to move through, not to mention the drain of resources that sometimes precludes this 
possibility altogether. Respondent D says that for these reasons, “most of the time I would prefer 
to negotiate stuff by advocacy-type work. It’s just more effective. It’s faster. It impacts more 
people.” 
 Another way in which social movements might be limited by an over-reliance on lawyers 
and court action is that lawyers who are willing and able to do this work are in short supply and 
already overworked. Respondent D speaks of her post-Katrina experience of having to deal with 
so many emergency situations that her clients and community groups were faced with that it 
became very difficult to work on the bigger picture structural change work that keeps her feeling 
connected to a larger social movement. 
A lot of what we do is by its nature an emergency, and that makes it even harder to kind 
of juggle your workload, because you really have no control over that part of the job. 
Sometimes what you have to do, which is a really hard thing for me to do, is telling 
people, “No, I can’t help you.” Because you sometimes get to the point where you’ll be 
totally ineffective if you keep taking more on. Then you can’t focus on the individual 
clients that you currently have or the bigger picture things that you want to do. 
 
Despite claims presented by the lawyers in a later section of this chapter that individual support 
and broader social change work are not mutually exclusive, we see in this example a clear 
limitation of legal advocacy that is based on the reality of limited resources, a reality that places 
lawyers in a position of having to make choices about how to focus their efforts. 
 In addition to expressing limitations of legal tactics, the lawyers in this study identify two 
main types of negative impacts on social movements that can result from litigation. One is the 
potential that a negative ruling will create “bad law” that will negatively affect other people. And 
the other is the possibility that legal action will slow or stop movement momentum. 
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 Respondent B provides an example of “these big impact litigation suits that, if you get a 
bad ruling on, if they are poorly drafted lawsuits or you have people who didn’t know what they 
were doing, then you have a lawsuit that has negative effects forever pretty much.” She 
recognizes this as especially worrisome in post-Katrina New Orleans where a lot of lawyers have 
been “coming in from out of town to do this big impact work and they don’t have good local 
council or sort know the ins and outs of things.” 
Respondent G offers the individual client litigation scenario counterpart to the big impact 
case that makes bad law. He recognizes the problem of making bad case law as a perennial 
dilemma for cause lawyers who represent individual clients, because ethically a lawyer is 
supposed to do what is best for the particular client without consideration for the broader 
consequences. Because of this he says, “We may push the envelope a little with one of them and 
get a bad ruling that may affect other people. That’s always a risk.” 
Respondents also indicate concern about the possible negative effect of litigation slowing 
movement momentum. Respondent E repeats a story told to him by a colleague of a 
neighborhood group that formed for the simple goal of having a stop sign installed at a 
particularly dangerous intersection. Neighborhood residents had repeatedly made requests 
through official channels to no avail. Frustrated with the lack of response, forty people convened 
a neighborhood meeting and hired a lawyer to be their advocate. The lawyer filed a lawsuit, had 
a big press conference and pursued the case for two years. After two years of legal wrangling the 
suit was successful and the stop sign was installed. The neighborhood group that had originally 
galvanized around the stop sign issue upon formation was initially energized by the lawsuit in a 
way that made them recognize the possibility that collectively they might be able to work 
towards other common neighborhood goals. But because of the long delay in reaching resolution 
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through the justice system, by the time it was settled and the group leaders invited the lawyer to a 
meeting to give her a plaque of recognition for her work, there were only seven people in 
attendance at what turned out to be their last group meeting. Respondent E concluded this story 
by saying that reliance on legal strategies can be disempowering if it is protracted and does not 
encourage the participation of citizens. He remarked that this is so even in successful cases, like 
in the example, and it is even more deflating in an unsuccessful case. “If you get to the end and 
you’ve lost, you would be lucky to have seven people there.” He summarizes this cautionary 
stance on legal mobilization and movement momentum by saying, “Used in the wrong way it can 
kill a movement. I mean if you take the excitement and enthusiasm of people and channel it all 
into a case, that’s a killer.” 
The expressions of respondents of the limitations of legal advocacy contained in this 
section can be examined in relation to the contested place of rights discourse that is at the heart 
of critical race theory and the questions raised by the utility of the law case studies examined 
earlier in this thesis. As established in an earlier section of this thesis, the critical argument 
against rights discourse was introduced by critical legal studies (CLS) scholars who criticized 
rights discourse as indeterminate. They argued that the legal definition of a right was 
indeterminate because it depended largely on social context and judicially interpreted meaning. 
In response, critical race theory (CRT) scholars agreed with much of the indeterminacy critique 
but argued that CLS scholars had ignored the transformative power of rights for a group of 
disempowered outsiders (Crenshaw, et al. 1995). The lack of complete faith in the legal system 
to effectively serve the cause for which these lawyers work is based on many of the same 
realizations that gave rise to the CLS movement. Nonetheless, considering their chosen 
profession, these lawyers have obviously not rejected traditional rights discourse and legal 
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mechanisms altogether. In concordance with the CRT scholars, a few of the respondents indicate 
that, despite its clear limitations, they see potential for redress through the law. And, also in the 
tradition of CRT, many of the respondents indicate a belief in the transformative value of the law 
and of rights claiming for marginalized people. 
The informants in this study present a gradient of skepticism concerning the promise of 
the law as a liberatory force. This range of opinion extends across a spectrum that can be 
generalized into three types of views. One of these views is displayed by two respondents who 
are most accepting of the promise of legal mechanisms to bring about social change and only 
qualify their acceptance by acknowledging that strong social movements are usually necessary to 
bolster legal tactics. A majority of respondents adhere to a view that is more skeptical about the 
promise of legal mechanisms. They are largely focused on doing legal support work for groups 
and organizations but represent individuals when they understand this work to support broader 
movement goals. These respondents consult with movement leaders to determine when and what 
legal tactics might be most effective. They see their work as just one aspect of a vibrant social 
movement, and they spend a portion of their time doing non-legal support work. A third type of 
view is exhibited by two respondents who are most highly skeptical of the promise of the legal 
mechanisms of traditional lawyering. They are highly integrated into community groups, have 
close relationships with movement leaders, and often do support work for the movement that 
extends beyond the traditional role of lawyer. They use legal forms in a way that, at times, 
boarders on cynical as a way to forward movement goals by framing issues for the movement 
and the public, by creating a space for voices to be formally heard, and by using legal discourse 
to energize the movement. 
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 The work of relationships 
 
 Respondents in this study talk on the subject of the significance of relationships in the 
work that they do at a higher frequency than any other topic or theme. Often in the course of our 
discussions we would be focused on a discrete aspect of their work and, as a way to help me 
understand how things work or how decisions are made, the lawyers would steer the discussion 
back to focus on relationships. In this way, the quality and challenges of various relationships 
internal and external to the collective movement organizations with which they work became 
central to many of the interviews. 
The respondents talk of collaborating with grassroots leaders and other lawyers. They 
speak of how relationships between cause lawyers and community groups build over time. They 
speak of relationships that are reaffirming and supportive, and they speak of relationships that 
tend to be restricting or disempowering. They talk about how they deal with conflict with their 
allies, and they talk about how they build relationships with power brokers. And more than 
anything they repeatedly refer back to the value that they place on human relationships. 
The respondents want to be meaningfully connected to others struggling for similar 
causes. They find numerous ways during the interviews to express the intention that their 
professional relationships should reflect their political beliefs. At the same time, the focus on 
relationships seems to also have more utilitarian, tactical purposes. These relationships enable 
outcomes of individual and community empowerment by facilitating transfers of knowledge 
from lawyers to community members. And, similarly, the lawyers tell of how their work is 
empowered through these relationships because of a transfer of knowledge of the reality of the 
conditions experienced by the people at the center of the social justice struggle that can serve as 
a foundation upon which the lawyer’s work can be built. And perhaps of most significance to 
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this research is the underlying theme of accountability implied by the lawyers’ focus on 
relationships. Trust that develops from strong, lasting relationships provides an atmosphere of 
internal accountability that increases the likelihood that the work of the lawyers remains 
congruent with the collective values.  
A prominent theme in the collective discourse of the cause lawyers interviewed in this 
research is that claiming membership in the activist community and feeling a sense of belonging 
to a larger movement provides a certain type of sustenance that motivates these lawyers to 
continue to struggle and work towards often evasive long term goals. As Respondent E puts it, 
“…if you are pushing the edge all the time and you continue doing that over time, there’s plenty 
of times you are going to lose. And the only way, I think, to continually do that is to be in 
relationships with people. And this is where it gets back to working with organizations.” The 
lawyers interviewed in this study repeatedly refer to the power of relationships in their work. 
Two respondents specify points of time at which it became necessary for them to assess the 
quality of their connection to community groups, connectedness to relationships that represent 
meaningful association with a larger movement, and the benefit that reconnection to the 
grassroots plays in their personal and professional lives. Respondent A says, 
I started out very connected to [the grassroots] and was very connected for a number of 
years. In the last couple of years, I felt like we had become disconnected in the office. 
There was a philosophical difference and I felt very disconnected from that and so I was 
compensating in my downtime by doing other things in the community and so I wanted 
to bridge that again, and so in the office I’m in now…we do a lot more community 
organizing, a lot of outreach, a lot of partnership with people in the community doing 
similar work…. 
 
Respondent H, who worked for some time outside of New Orleans, came back to the area 
after Hurricane Katrina to support local efforts for a just recovery. She speaks of her earlier 
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professional experiences outside of New Orleans and her reconnection to the activist community 
upon her return to New Orleans. 
When I first started…I worked directly with community groups. But actually, because my 
role was strictly as a litigator, even though I was working very directly with community 
groups all the time, I felt like I was more locked into playing the role of a traditional 
lawyer, you know, going to court, helping them. I mean, there was definitely advocacy 
strategy going on, but I don’t think I felt as connected [in my previous job] to a 
movement as I have since moving back here. I’m from here…and now I am really able to 
see how my skills as a lawyer can fit into broader social change ideas. 
 
Respondent H makes an important distinction between the connection she feels through her 
multi-faceted support work with the activist community in New Orleans and her relative lack of 
connection in her previous “strictly as a litigator” way of lawyering for community groups. This 
sentiment is expressed in the narratives of others as well. Respondent F identifies a feeling of 
“hope” that motivates people to enter this realm of lawyering and to continue doing this type of 
work and points to the role of relationships within the community of movement participants. “I 
think people come [to this work] with this hope and then it fades. You don’t need it every day. 
You don’t need it even every week, but you have to be around other people that are trying to do 
it…. It’s not like anybody else is going to feed us. That’s why the little communities we belong 
to are so important.” This statement provides further evidence of the motivating and sustenance 
providing functions of social movement communities that likely also extend to types of social 
movement participants other than cause lawyers. 
 Some of the literature on cause lawyering suggests that there is a real potential for 
lawyers to disempower or otherwise derail people’s movements because of inherent power 
differentials in the relationships between the elite professional lawyers and the rest of the 
movement actors. This theme is elaborated on in a branch of law and society discourse that deals 
explicitly with the roles of lawyers and activists and lawyers as activists with special attention to 
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how activists who are not lawyers view what lawyers do to and for movements. A cursory look 
at some examples from these secondary sources begins to draw out some of the complexities of 
the relationship negotiations between activists and lawyers that can help illuminate similar 
complexities in the discourse of the respondents in this research. 
 Sandra Levitsky (2006) contributes to this examination with her inter-organizational 
analysis of the gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) movement in Chicago. She found 
that even when legal work by GLBT legal advocacy organizations had been successful in 
producing positive results in line with the goals of the broader movement, non-lawyers within 
the movement felt like the lawyers had their own agenda, were exclusionary of the rest of the 
community, and forced their particular issues to the forefront of movement at the expense of 
issues promoted by other groups within the movement. She found that one of the main 
mechanisms that allowed the legal organizations to do this was their relatively much larger 
budgets and fulltime professional staff. Essentially, she argues that the elite status of lawyers 
situates them much differently than other movement actors and sets up a dynamic in which non-
lawyer activists are at risk of being disempowered and less visible. 
 This problem of “lawyer dominance” is critical to the discussion of the relationships 
between cause lawyers and social movements in this thesis. But it should be noted that many 
scholars, such as Silverstein (1996), present more nuanced and multi-dimensional accounts of 
negotiations between lawyers and other activists, in which lawyer dominance is certainly an 
issue to be negotiated but the problems are not as stark as in Levitsky’s study. These more 
nuanced ideas of how power dynamics play out appear to be more in line with the experience of 
the lawyers in this study. 
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 I found among this particular group of lawyers a noticeable hyper-sensitivity to lawyer 
dominance issues. Perhaps this is a defining quality of a cause lawyer. They express certain 
overriding political commitments to what can be generally described as empowering the 
individuals and groups for whom they work, and they seem to use these political beliefs as a 
guide to how they want to conduct themselves in their working relationships. Most express a 
significant awareness of potential and actual power differentials and how they might harm a 
collective movement. Several talk extensively about what they try to do to maintain a healthy 
balance. Respondent B says, “[Maintaining this balance] requires listening to others very 
carefully. And I think [law partner’s name] does that really well, you know, by pulling out the 
legal issues but trying to let them lead in terms of where they go and let them decide what kind 
of advocacy, whether it be litigation or media or whatever.” 
 Respondent E echoes the importance of listening carefully to the people with whom one 
collaborates, and he adds to the discussion the importance of humility. 
Part of maintaining successful and balanced relationships with the people you are 
working with comes from experience and good listening, because a lot of lawyers don’t 
have experience with folks…. Part of that is humility, understanding your limitations, and 
that even if you are the best lawyer in the world…that this grandmother who didn’t get 
anything more than a high school education may be a better advocate than you are. 
 
This respondent also reports that through time he has developed a strength of relationship with 
the organizers and community members with whom he frequently works. The trust that he has 
developed allows these power relationships to be regularly checked and the balance maintained. 
He says, 
I’m at a point now with most of the folks that I work with where they will check me. 
They will say, “This is not a part we need you for.” I think a lot of it is just having 
enough experience to realize that you are just one part. You know, there’s plenty of 
things that I can’t do, and there’s plenty of things that I shouldn’t do. 
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In this statement we can see how internal accountability is developed through relationships over 
time. 
 A number of the informants provide accounts of the collaborative process between cause 
lawyers and organizers working within social movements. This process of collaboration is the 
arena in which these relationships grow and are tested. Respondent E regularly attends strategy 
meetings with community organizers. He talks about the fact that he is often welcomed to the 
table as more than just a consultant on legal matters related to movement activities. He is 
accepted as another type of organizer who is able to collaborate with other organizers on issues 
of broader campaign strategy, whether or not it relates directly to his skills as a specialist in the 
law. When asked why he thinks he has been able to step into this more expansive role, he says 
that it has to do with long-lasting relationships with a number of the organizers; relationships that 
he characterizes as mutually beneficial learning experiences.  
I think organizers are so important and I always try to learn from them…. I go to these 
meetings and there’s rarely a lot of lawyers in them. And so you get to put these skills to 
work. And the great thing is that you have some skills, some links, some resources that 
other people don’t have. The people in the meeting often have skills and resources that 
you don’t have and so again it’s the idea of a relationship, that I learn, and they learn, and 
that we pool and do what we can do. 
 
 Respondent B talks about how the cause lawyer working with a movement may have 
unique perspectives to offer the movement in the strategizing processes that stem from their 
specific training and experience. She suggests that this perspective can provide important insight 
on issues that extend beyond discrete legal matters that can prove valuable to the group decision-
making process. Respondent B also indicates in the following passage that the lawyer is just one 
of many types of specialists that contribute to well-rounded social movements. 
I think that working hand-in-hand with organizers is key. In working hand-in-hand with 
community members you need someone there thinking about how to make structural 
change and systemic change…changing systems, changing laws, changing policies 
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…people who understand that sort of over-arching structure. And maybe we don’t 
understand it as well as we should or know how to change it exactly for the best 
but…that’s why I wanted to go to law school. And also the way that lawyers are trained 
to think is slightly different than other people. I think it is actually really valuable to have 
somebody on a team that thinks very logically, not necessarily linearly, but analytically. I 
think that it is really a good idea to have somebody like that when you are doing any 
major organizing or social movement. You also need the economist, and the artist, and 
the mechanic, and those folks, so it’s a major asset to have a couple of people who think 
like that. 
 
Respondent B suggests, in the passage above, a particular value that lawyers bring to these 
relationships. Respondent E makes a point of saying that lawyers also benefit from these 
relationships. He says that he really started to be able to function as an integral part of grassroots 
movements when he became conscious of “how much they were teaching me.”  
In 1971 Jonathon Black published Radical Lawyers: Their Role in the Movement and in 
the Courts. It concludes with a number of selections that suggest the importance of a particular 
direction in which some radical lawyers of the time were looking. Interestingly, the direction is 
inwards. Commenting on the significance of introspection to the work of the movement lawyer 
Black, in the introduction to his book, says, “The more willing they are to shed their cloak of 
special knowledge and status, the more invaluable they will become to the forces of 
change….But the radical lawyer who balks at such an exploration of self can never be a true 
radical….If he is eager to participate in the quest for liberation, then he must himself be open to 
liberation.”  Of greatest interest to my research is the notion presented by Black that the efforts 
of radical lawyers to engage in a critical introspection might produce new models of lawyering 
that transform traditional relationships between lawyers and the state and lawyers and their 
clients, models that endeavor to empower those for whom they work and interrupt the traditional 
systemic power differentials that American legalism reinforces. 
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 When the cause lawyers talk about how and with whom they collaborate it is apparent 
that virtually all of these lawyers see relationships as critical to the work that they do. But there 
is also some real variation from one to another of they way they do their work and with whom 
they collaborate. Some work almost exclusively at the grassroots level. Some do work that is 
more rooted in the mainstream establishment. Others do some of both. Without further 
investigation of these relationships from the perspective of those with whom the lawyers work, it 
is difficult to objectively assess the degree to which the lawyers are truly successful in their 
efforts to avoid lawyer dominance and develop mutually empowering relationships. What I can 
report is that I observe a clear recognition on the part of nearly all the respondents of the 
potential for power imbalances in their working relationships. They are able to freely talk about 
these dynamics and what they do to mitigate against doing harm in their working relationships.  
 Feeling situated in a movement 
 
 Law and society scholar Thomas Hilbink (2006) documents a shift in cause lawyering 
during the civil rights movement from an “elite/vanguard” model toward “grassroots” cause 
lawyering in which lawyers sought to situate themselves much more within movements, and 
integrate their legal support work as just one of many pieces of a functional movement. Hilbink 
states that in the initial stages of the movement the most prominent approach of movement 
lawyers was dominated by “a belief that society’s ills can be cured through legal action” (p. 64). 
He argues that these lawyers adopted an “elite/vanguard” method of lawyering in their approach 
to working with social movements as expert specialists with a “focus on law as the primary 
means for bringing about change” (p. 64). The emergence of grassroots social movement 
lawyering in the late 1960s and 1970s displaced the elite/vanguard model and was characterized 
by movement lawyers who worked as collaborators with movement activists rather than 
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removed, expert directors of strategy. These lawyers saw the movement struggles in much the 
same way that movement activists saw them.  They were not leaders of the movement or even 
always at the core of the movement, necessarily, but they were certainly part of the movement. 
This emergent wave of grassroots lawyers worked within social movements and challenged the 
prevailing professional standard that lawyers must remain disinterested and neutral. This shift 
paved the way for cause lawyers committed to social justice to participate in integral ways in 
aspects of social movements that include but extend beyond litigation. 
Social movements involve coalitions of people using their particular skills in 
collaboration with others on a common cause. A tension that exists in the relationships between 
cause lawyers and social movements is the possibility that the elite professional status of the 
lawyer may create imbalances in the movement that may tend to place more importance on the 
legal aspects than on the many other levels on which a social movement functions. This tension 
is discussed in the literature on cause lawyers and social movements, and an awareness of this 
abounds in the narratives of the informants in this study, as was brought forth in the preceding 
section on cause lawyers’ perception of relationships importance. 
 A factor that may reduce the potential for lawyer dominance is the notable fact that 
nearly all of the respondents conceive of themselves and their work as being just one piece of the 
larger social justice movements in which they work. This deeply held understanding of their 
relative role within a larger movement may help counteract some of the tendencies for lawyers 
and legal mechanisms to dominate the movements of which they are a part. The recognition that 
their work is only one part of a larger movement is a defining characteristic of what it means to 
be a cause lawyer. 
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 Respondents in this study tell of the diversity of ways that they are involved in the 
support of causes that extend beyond litigation. There is a wealth of data on this topic that comes 
through in the interviews. This will be explored in greater detail in the later section entitled 
expanding notions of professional and political responsibilities. But first, in this section, I will 
look at the degree to which these lawyers see themselves as situated within a movement, and 
what they understand as the relative role that legal tactics play in relationship to other movement 
tactics. In this section, I share examples of how cause lawyers consciously frame their work as 
being situated within a movement. Following these examples, I present three interrelated sub-
themes that arise from a comprehensive look at what the respondents say about the importance of 
being situated in a movement. First is the sub-theme of reservations regarding the ability of legal 
mechanisms, in and of themselves, to effect change on the scale that social movements seek. 
This leads to a second sub-theme expressed by most respondents that it is the duty of the lawyer 
to insure that legal components do not become central to the movement. The third sub-theme that 
arises from these narratives is that, as part of a well-rounded movement consisting of a variety of 
tactical approaches, legal tactics can be most helpful to movement goals in a support role, as one 
tool in the push for change. 
 As is shown in the previous section that looks into the negative impacts and limitations of 
legal mechanisms as expressed by the respondents in this study, these lawyers express 
reservations about the ability of legal mechanisms to effect change in and of themselves without 
a broader movement designed to push for change on other levels. But the data I looked at relative 
to this theme shows that these lawyers understand the legal tactics at their disposal as being “one 
simple tool in an arsenal of weapons that people have to bring about change, or to stall, or to at 
least bring about opportunities for people” (Respondent E). This same lawyer goes on to say that, 
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“If it is all in court, I think that there is no chance…. [Litigation] is just one tool, like anything 
else, that can be used for good or bad…. It needs to be used along with other tools though.” This 
is another indication that legal pressure in isolation, even if it results in a victory in court, does 
not necessarily equate to meaningful social change of the sort being advocated for by movement 
actors. 
In spite of the respondents’ expressed desires to work in solidarity with social 
movements, there are of course challenges to cause lawyers who try to integrate themselves into 
movements in the mode of grassroots lawyer. Respondent B directly discusses the problem that 
lawyers and their movement allies have regarding their mutual desire to ensure that a coalition is 
really a coalition and that the lawyer is not driving it all and making all the decisions. She says of 
this potential problem, 
I think that is a question that we always have to keep in mind, because we have these 
ideas in mind of the legal paths that other people don’t have in mind. I think it is 
important to not make the legal action be the center of the movement. Your goal is not to 
change the law. Your goal is, let’s say, to create equity in schools, and changing the law 
is part of that. You also need to get parents involved. You also need to get funding. You 
also need to have support of the City Council. These things that the lawyer doesn’t 
necessarily need to have anything to do with. So it’s like the legal pieces are just that. 
They are pieces. They are fringe pieces….What happens in court is a really small thing 
compared to the bigger movement. 
 
In the passage above the lawyer talks about how it is important for her to maintain an expansive 
view of the ultimate movement goals and to make sure that the legal component of the struggle 
does not take center stage in the movement at the expense of its other components. Respondent I 
supports this understanding of the challenge of recognizing the legal component as merely one 
aspect of a movement by saying, “The lawsuit isn’t the only thing. And it’s hard not to fixate on 
that, especially when there is a big loss, or maybe even if there is a big win, but things fit 
together as pieces of a broader strategy and a broader movement.” 
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The lawyers make comments such as, “…the case is only one half of one percent of what 
is going on…” and, “…typically, the lawsuit is just one small piece and part of the problem of 
the lawyer is to constantly help people adjust their expectations.” This suggests that these 
lawyers see it as part of their role to make sure that their work does not become central to the 
movement and that they make sure to constantly stress to others in the movement that they 
should not put all their eggs in the same legal basket.  
The following passage from an interview with Respondent B clearly communicates some 
of the ideas at the root of why it is important to these lawyers that they see themselves as 
integrated into a robust movement active on many levels. 
 …if it is part of a movement, you don’t want your lawsuit to be the only thing, and you 
want widespread support of your lawsuit. You want everyone you ever talk to [in the 
movement] to be like, “Oh, wow. I’m so glad you sued.” Because that is a kind of 
pressure that will help it be more successful. If you have the support of the community, 
you will have great plaintiffs to choose from. Whether or not the judge would ever admit 
it, the judge would be affected by all the media attention. And also if you have attention 
on it, you will have attorneys coming to work with you on it who will be brilliant and 
have access to all sorts of resources. So to me that is a major condition for a lawsuit…if 
you are talking about litigation in social justice movements…in order to be part of a 
movement you need to have the rest of the movement happening and the lawsuit part is 
just one piece of that. 
 
Other respondents indicate that they understand the importance of having a robust social 
movement of which legal tactics are just one way to take action. Respondent J, for example, 
says, 
…but we are only a stick, because we never would have been able to close that landfill 
had it not been for the political pressure from the community…. Rarely, and I mean 
rarely, do you have a legal victory that by itself results in serious social change. I mean 
you can see a Brown v. Board of Ed. coming around once every hundred years. And in 
the environmental movement it’s really the same thing. Typically a lawsuit is just one 
part of a piece. 
 
Others confirm this understanding of the importance of integrating legal tactics into a well-
rounded movement instead of taking legal action in isolation with hopes to effect change. 
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Respondent B does so with the statement, “I don’t think it is ever a good solution by itself to just 
go to the court for real social change.” Respondent F says, 
So if you are going to court to look for justice, you are going to be disappointed most of 
the time. Now, however, if you are with a group of people who are challenging the City 
Council, the State Legislature, the Congress, and developers, and stuff like that, then 
litigation can be one simple tool in the arsenal of weapons that people have to bring about 
change or stall, or to bring about opportunities for people. If it is all in court, I think that 
there is no chance, I think that the courts follow and don’t lead. 
 
Marshall (2006) maintains that lawyers and movement activists can cooperate to employ 
a variety of legal and direct action strategies that can frame the issue in ways that can gain 
popular support for the cause. She provides examples of strategies developed cooperatively 
between movement leaders and lawyers that involve a combination of legal strategies and direct 
action strategies more familiar to the activists. This resembles the ideal version of collaboration 
that several lawyers describe. She posits that this interaction may be, in the end, favorable to the 
movement, as it’s members “through this interaction with the legal system…learn how to gain 
control over the political processes that govern their lives” (Marshall 2006:178). 
The informants clearly express a common understanding that their roles as cause lawyers 
are essentially support roles. They have special skills to offer in a specific arena of action, but at 
the same time, they try to remain cognizant of the broader agenda of the group. Consider the 
following statement by Respondent H. “I see lawyers as being kind of in the back of the pack 
providing support that the movement needs, so that’s how I see it in an ideal sense. That the 
work I do is ideally connected to community groups and advocates for a larger agenda for social 
change.” Respondent B says, “The idea is that we are supporting social justice movements that 
originate and are driven by the community.” When speaking about the balance of this 
relationship these lawyers place emphasis on the words in an ideal sense and ideally, and the 
idea is when describing the optimal relationship between the cause lawyer in a support role and 
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the rest of the movement. This suggests the existence of real challenges to maintaining this 
balance. The other themes in this chapter help us understand what these challenges are and how 
cause lawyers respond to these challenges. But, at this point in the analysis it is clear that, on the 
whole, these lawyers strive to be integrated into and supportive of the broad movement. 
 Alternative measures of success 
A current that runs throughout the themes of this analysis is that the work of the cause 
lawyer often involves activity that extends beyond simple litigation, and since the political 
climate in which they are operating often does not lend itself to clear and immediate success in 
or out of court, these lawyers are challenged by the need to measure their success and that of the 
larger movement beyond simply whether or not they win in court. In this section, I look at how 
cause lawyers define success in this context. I turn to the cause lawyers themselves to define 
lawyering success and what they understand to be movement success. This approach reveals that 
cause lawyers find various and sometimes surprising ways to measure the success of their work.  
Almost unanimously, the respondents indicate that, in their worlds, success is not 
measured in the traditional terms of wins and losses. Respondent I says, “Success is not like 
getting a shiny star at the end of they day. And it’s not just about getting a win. It’s really about 
feeling good enough about it to keep going.” Respondent H reinforces the claim that for this 
class of lawyers, success is not simply about winning cases. He says, “It’s definitely not about 
winning cases. And it’s not even about the number of individual situations that get resolved. I 
don’t think about it like that. I guess it’s more how I feel about it. Like, do I feel good about the 
work…feeling like I’m not working in a bubble.” Respondents agree that for them success is not 
just about litigation success, but they describe a variety of alternative ways of measuring success 
in their work. 
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Only one respondent offers quantitative ways of measuring success. Respondent G, who 
works in a non-profit organization that provides legal representation to poor people, says,  
We count the number of people our work is benefiting both through individual cases and 
we try to estimate haw many have benefited from the cases that we believe had systemic 
effect. We figure a rough dollar value of our advocacy and direct service, and we collect 
information about how we have influenced policy and practice changes. 
 
He describes this as a typical model used to measure outcomes in the non-profit world. The rest 
of the respondents offer less quantitative, but highly descriptive, explanations of how they define 
success. 
It is clear from what the respondents share that they do not measure success in traditional 
ways. We can look at the variety of ways of defining and measuring the success of their work to 
try to understand some general patterns of response. Because they do not expect to win 
frequently in or out of court, the respondents tend to take a long view of the potential for broad 
social change, and they look for small successes to mark progress along this path. Interestingly, 
and in concordance with the earlier finding of the high significance accorded personal 
relationships, many measure success by the quality of their relationships with the people with 
whom and for whom they work. Respondents also indicate that simply being a part of a 
collective struggle and supporting a continued resistance helps cause lawyers feel successful in 
their work. A final, significant sub-theme repeated by a number of respondents is that they find 
success when they feel that their work is providing a vehicle for the previously unheard to have 
their voices heard. 
Respondent F begins to offer an articulation of why the nature of cause lawyering 
requires a different standard by which to measure success.  
Justice work and working with community groups is very messy, very unpredictable, 
very unsystematic. You can have a sense that you are trying to do the right thing, are on 
the right side, but it is not clear if, first of all, there will ever be a victory, and second of 
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all, where it’s going to come from . . . Hopefully, something will change in a way that 
you will be able to see . . . but that’s part of your limitations. 
 
These lawyers are keenly aware of the need that they feel to work out the meaning of success for 
themselves. Respondent A says, “You have to define your own victories, you know?” This 
notion is affirmed by Respondent E when he says, “I think you have to search that out and help 
to create that narrative for yourself and for the group, because if you don’t have some success, 
you’ll quit.” Cause lawyers must find ways to discern small, intermittent successes from the 
uncertain climate of the protracted social justice campaigns of which they are a part. They are 
motivated to keep working toward broad and often evasive goals by finding success in “the little 
things” that can be framed as small steps toward a broader goal.  
You’ve got to look for small, individual successes. For this person, on this day, it 
mattered that I went to court with them. For this family, on this day, it mattered that they 
were treated with dignity in the system. And I can find success in that, even though my 
ultimate goals may be as big as transforming the juvenile justice system or abolishing the 
death penalty or bringing every survivor back home who was living in the 9th Ward 
before the storm hit…It’s almost like that [small success] has to be enough or you will 
never survive in this. (Respondent A) 
 
Respondent B makes a statement that, for her also, “some of the biggest successes are the 
little things.” She shares a story of what she identifies as a recent success. She had been working 
for a number of months helping some neighborhood-level grassroots activists establish their 
post-Katrina dream of building a community center in their flood devastated neighborhood. She 
assisted this group with the legal aspects of their project such as navigating the zoning 
ordinances and incorporating as a non-profit. She proudly shared with me a newspaper clipping 
featuring the opening of the community center. She concludes her story of working on this 
project by saying, “It’s the little things. And hopefully it all builds into a bigger picture…little 
successes that hopefully support a broader agenda of social justice.” 
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 We see in the previous passage an example of a lawyer taking a broad view of long-term 
movement success and measuring small, incremental steps down that path. Related to this view 
is a sub-theme expressed by several lawyers of measuring success in terms of proper process 
versus ultimate outcome. As informant E states,  “Success is much more about being involved 
and participating in the struggle for justice than it is in achieving any clear and final successes. 
At some point in your life, it becomes that you are doing the right thing with the right people 
and, you know, maybe you’ll win, and maybe you won’t win.” For many of these lawyers it 
appears that proper process involves forming collaborative relationships and engaging in mutual, 
principled struggle. Respondent F says, “…and so success is, I think, in relationships…getting to 
know people and just fighting the good fight.” Similarly, Respondent A speaks about finding 
success or satisfaction through collective acts of resistance. “We can feel successful when we put 
up a fight . . . when we don’t let things just happen to people without a struggle. And, you know, 
sometimes I guess all you can do is bear witness and stand to fight another [day]. But at least it 
didn’t happen quietly.”  
 Interestingly, when speaking of their ability to find success in simply being part of 
struggle, two respondents offer strikingly similar metaphors. Respondent F says, “You are part of 
a river, a movement, of people who have been trying a long time before you were around…and 
occasionally, as a lawyer, you are able to get somebody out of jail or help stop them from being 
evicted or very small concrete things and you say, ‘You know, I don’t know where the rest of 
this is going, but I think we are able to do this.’ ” This river analogy is complemented by 
Respondent E’s metaphor of the “great flow” of a movement over time. “A real understanding of 
justice…makes you humble about what you as a person can accomplish…you realize you are in 
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this great flow and history of people doing what they can to try to do something about justice and 
you’ve got a little role to play and sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t.” 
One lawyer shared with me a story about a time in which he was asked to explain how 
movement participants, including the lawyers, find reason to celebrate successes when they are 
seemingly losing time and time again. In this story, the respondent was defending a large group 
of activists who had been arrested for an act of civil disobedience. He was in the courtroom for 
several days in a row and one of the law enforcement personnel who had been witnessing the 
proceedings, while escorting the respondent out of the courthouse, began to ask some questions 
to try to understand this dynamic. This is the account that exchange: 
I’m walking out of the courtroom one day and this big power-lifting cop was with me and 
he says, “[first name of respondent], this is the thing I don’t understand.” He said, 
“You’re in court with all these people. You put on all these papers and arguments about 
international law and justice and all that other stuff. You lose every damn argument you 
make. All of your clients are found guilty and sent to jail. But when you walk out of the 
courthouse everybody cheers. What’s up with that?” And that’s when I said, “It’s just a 
different environment. People recognize they are not going to win right now, but they are 
going to try to do the right thing anyway and feel like they are just trying to move the ball 
forward a little bit. And that hopefully, at one point, they will be found to have been on 
the right side and they participated in moving this thing forward and they are living out 
their convictions and that stuff. And so all I am doing is making a little space for them in 
the courtroom and for their family so that they can tell some of their story and they can 
have their day or their half hour or whatever it is to be able to do this stuff and then to 
help them explain to their family and friends what they are doing.” And so it is clearly 
not about the traditional criteria of success (Respondent F). 
 
Within the respondent’s account we find evidence of movement participants and their lawyer 
framing their efforts as just one part of a broader struggle. He clearly states that they do not look 
toward a “traditional criteria of success.” And he introduces an important activity through which 
cause lawyers often are able to claim success. He talks about “making a little space for them [the 
movement activists]…so that they can tell some of their story.” In these interviews several 
lawyers talk about finding satisfaction and measures of success through their role of facilitating 
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the expression of the voice(s) of the too often unheard. Respondent A says, “…sometimes, I 
guess, all you can do is bear witness…so that [the injustice] doesn’t happen without anyone 
noticing, so that people know there are faces that go with this struggle…stories that go with it.” 
This sentiment is line with the CRT assertion of the importance of voice and the suggestion that 
legal rights claiming provides a venue in which voices can be expressed. 
Another respondent offers an example of how other lawyers often struggle with the 
notion of prioritizing the facilitation of expression of these voices over doing whatever it takes to 
get a “win.” Respondent E has collaborated with other lawyers who are less experienced working 
with social movement activists who sometimes tell him regarding their frustrations in working 
with defiant, non-compliant movement activists, “You gotta tell them to shut up. They are going 
to fuck up the case.” To which he responds, “Look, it’s not about the case. It’s not the win and 
the loss of the case for them. They have something they need to say and we are here to give them 
the space to say it.” The same attorney provides another example of this in the following 
passage. 
We had an experience since Katrina where we had some migrant workers who were 
doing some stuff in the hotels and stuff like that and were able to get a big national civil 
rights group to take on the case and then they wanted to start telling the workers that they 
couldn’t talk to the owner without the lawyers being there because it violated attorney-
client privilege and set up problems for the deposition and stuff like this, but the point is 
to empower the workers to be able to make more decisions for themselves and give them 
the voice to speak out. And even if it caused problems for the case or caused problems for 
the lawyers, the point is that the lawsuit might help protect people and they would rather 
be able to talk in an organized way with the owners than to win the lawsuit. So you have 
these contradictory things there. 
 
These are representative examples of the variety of reasons that cause lawyers tend to 
look beyond whether or not they are winning cases to find alternative measures of how they and 
the larger movement are being successful in their work. These lawyers see their efforts as being 
situated in the contemporary social justice movements that they support as well as being 
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connected to historical global and local struggles for justice. This perspective allows them to take 
a long view of the potential effects of their work. And understanding themselves as being 
situated within this context helps them to continue, often without the benefit of immediate, 
tangible and widespread results, to work toward their ultimate goals because they are able to see 
small successes and seemingly minor contributions as contributing to the larger effort of working 
for social justice. 
In summation, one broad way that cause lawyers measure their relative success is by 
asking to what degree they have been able to empower people or “make space” for voices to be 
heard. There was another commonality in responses that indicates that lawyers measure success 
according to whether or not they are able to maintain a principled focus in their work. As 
Respondent A asks, “Is [my practice] consistent with the principles that I say guide my life? Is it 
important? And this sounds kind of trite, but at the end of the day, is it making the world a better 
place than I found it?” In the end the lawyers indicate that what really matters most to them are 
the components of their work that assist community building, empowerment, and accessing and 
facilitating the expression of social movement constituents’ grievances. 
Ameliorating symptoms versus addressing root causes 
In “Revolutionary Lawyering” Bill Quigley (2006) states that people in general, and 
lawyers in particular, have been taught that radical change is not possible, and that from this 
thought it follows that the best a social justice minded lawyer can do is to forget about working 
for more substantial goals of systemic social change and just do things to help individuals in their 
struggles. According to Quigley, these beliefs contribute to the development of a class of 
progressive lawyers who work to help individuals deal with some of the symptoms of their larger 
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struggles, but who are not oriented to attack the larger issues from which these symptomatic 
problems arise.  
Respondent C recognizes that many of her colleagues practice this mode of lawyering. 
She says that there are actually quite a few private attorneys, including ones from big firms, who 
do pro bono public interest work. But her assessment is that, although most of this work is 
certainly helpful to individuals, it is so limited in its scope that there is not any real hope that it 
can effect substantive change for society as a whole. Earlier in her career, Respondent C worked 
for an organization that offered legal support to the homeless population. Most of the other 
lawyers doing that work, she says, were private lawyers from big firms who wanted to come out 
into the streets and shelters once a week to do charity style service work that addresses 
symptoms but not causes of social inequities. She comments, “…they did not necessarily want 
social change coming from there. They really were a ‘help-the-person-with-the-individual-case’ 
kind of group and that’s pretty much it. They didn’t want to do anything a little bit 
controversial.” This was not enough for Respondent C who wanted to do more. She felt 
resistance from her colleagues to her desire to do things that “…they thought were politically not 
a good idea, like voting rights type of stuff for homeless people… ,” and she decided to leave 
this project to look for work in which she might hope to have a broader impact by addressing the 
causes of societal inequalities that are at the root of people’s struggles. 
In Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice, Lopez 
(1992) describes and names a tradition of “regnant” progressive lawyering for subordinated 
people that results from the mindset described in the previous paragraph. (He uses the term 
“subordinated” to describe individuals who inhabit the bottom of the political, social, and 
economic hierarchies for reasons of age, class, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, or sexual 
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orientation.) Lopez challenges the prevalent “regnant” tradition of progressive lawyering by 
claiming that no matter how well intentioned the progressive lawyer fighting "the good fight" 
might be, unless he can break free of these ideas of practice and professionalism, he will merely 
reproduce the subordinating assumptions of “traditional legal and popular cultures.” These 
assumptions are often deeply engrained and difficult to break free of. Lopez writes about how 
this idea both “surrounds” and “dwells within” progressive lawyers. The regnant idea, “defines a 
lawyer’s connection to her job, to what she knows, to those who work with and around her, to 
the institutions in which she functions, and to the society she desires to change” (p.23). Lopez 
claims that many progressive lawyers who do not step out of the traditional framework of 
“regnant” lawyering end up stripping clients of agency and relegating them to roles of passivity 
and obedience. 
Bill Quigley (1994) says that Stephen Wexler’s Practicing Law for Poor People (1970) is 
considered an “autocite” for writers about advocacy for poor and powerless people because, at 
the time Quiqley was writing, there were so few examples of good quotable writing on the topic 
of the relationships between lawyers, poor people and organizing. And although a number of 
good examples have been produced in the intervening years, Wexler’s points still are significant 
to this exploration of models for public interest law work. Wexler states that, despite a growing 
interest in poverty law at the time he was writing, most poverty lawyers adopt a conventional 
model of lawyering; one that is similar to the model that Gerald Lopez refers to as “regnant” 
lawyering. But as Wexler points out “the traditional model of legal practice for private clients is 
not what poor people need; in many ways it is exactly what they do not need” (p.1049). Wexler 
advocates for putting the lawyer’s skills to use in poor people’s movements in a more effective, 
albeit nontraditional, way with a focus on community organizing versus solving individual legal 
 90
problems. Wexler writes, “The two major touchstones of traditional legal practice—the solving 
of legal problems and the one-to-one relationship between attorney and client—are either 
irrelevant to poor people or harmful to them” (p.1053). This model isolates poor people from one 
another and fails to empower clients, provide them with new skills, or meaningfully address any 
of the fundamental issues that motivate them to seek legal help. Any legal remedy that a lawyer 
might provide via this traditional framework often leaves the client “precisely where he found 
them, except that they will have developed a dependency on his skills to smooth out the roughest 
spots in their lives” (p.1053). 
It can be deduced from the narratives of respondents that they entertain complex, varied 
and sometimes conflicting views of the two types of models of lawyering presented and 
respectively criticized and advocated for by Lopez and Wexler. Respondents in this study 
express a common impulse to do work to improve the circumstances of people’s lives. 
Individually, they rely on direct legal problem-solving for individuals to varying degrees. Some 
do quite a lot of individual representation and see this work as meeting some immediate needs 
and being supportive of larger efforts on a slow march towards greater justice and eventual social 
change. Others do very little individual representation and choose to focus more on 
organizational support and broader impact work, such as legislation, class-action suits, and other 
tactics that respondents refer to as “impact work.” But despite the differences in their chosen 
modes of practice, they all indicate that, in and of itself, direct legal representation is an 
insufficient means of producing major change. They strive to effect more systemic change, and 
they have varied ideas about the best way to do this. Most of the respondents conceive of 
themselves as being more committed to objectives of social change than their mainstream 
counterparts. It is possible to bring forth from this analysis a distinction between the more 
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common charity-style service work of many liberal, public-interest lawyers that is focused on 
ameliorating symptoms of social conditions and the work of cause lawyers that is more focused 
on attacking root causes of social inequities in a way that is aimed at lasting social change and is 
more rooted in social movement communities. A number of respondent statements imply an 
understanding of this distinction.  
This discussion highlights a relevant tension in the work of the cause lawyer between the 
motivation to do more broadly focused social change work and the underlying motivation to help 
people in an environment in which there is such enormous, immediate, and unmet need for 
individual representation. Interestingly though, most respondents in this study indicate that they 
either don’t recognize this as a tension in their professional lives or have developed ways in 
which they feel they are able to maintain a balance between serving the needs of individuals and 
doing more broadly focused impact work. 
 Respondent I responds to probes related to this tension by saying, “I’ve got to say that it 
is not really a tension for me. It takes a lot of time to do individual work, but I really believe in 
it.” She believes that the impact work must be rooted in the lives and individual stories of 
individuals. “There’s just no way to do that [impact work] unless you are walking around talking 
to people and know what’s going on.” She contrasts this to the post-Katrina phenomenon of the 
arrival of many well-meaning, but less than optimally effective, out-of-town lawyers wanting to 
do “big impact litigation” but who are unable to ground their efforts in the lives of real people 
because they haven’t done the individual representation and legal counsel. She sums up her 
feelings about this balance by saying,  “There would be no way to do public interest law without 
being connected to the community you serve.” For her, individual representation is a way to stay 
connected to the community in a way that can strengthen any attempts to do the broader impact 
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work. She says that the way that she and other lawyers do this is by helping people solve their 
individual problems and by “talking to people, collecting their stories, and being able understand 
the laws well enough so that we can translate their stories into lawsuits if necessary.” 
 Respondent B also says that, despite some tension in maintaining a balance, the 
individual representation that focuses on addressing individual symptoms and broad impact work 
that focuses on root causes are actually complementary endeavors. She says, “I see them as the 
same thing,” and talks about the importance of being selective about the cases that one chooses. 
She recognizes that since it is impossible to meet everyone’s individual needs for representation, 
it is best to chose to work on the individual cases that are likely to be able to support 
opportunities for broadly focused impact litigation.  She also talks about how representing 
organizations or groups of people can more effectively meet the needs of a greater number of 
individuals. She also feels that her organizational support work has a greater potential of 
eventually influencing social policy than is the case with straight individual representation.  
Respondent E also expresses a preference for working with community groups as a way 
to impact more individuals. He says, “… a lawyer with an organization can have far more impact 
than a lawyer with individual clients or stuff like that.” He says that he doesn’t neglect the work 
of individual representation completely. Instead, he says that he will represent individual clients 
as long as they are “…part of a movement…and ‘movement’ very broadly defined…you know, 
everything from a neighborhood and that sort of thing.” He provides an example of how his 
focus on organizational support does not mean that he doesn’t ever represent individuals. He 
talks about how individual representation, within the context of an organization or broadly 
defined movement, can help the activists he works with stay focused on their efforts. He gave 
examples of how he feels like it is an important role of the movement lawyer to “get folks back 
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out on the street” who have been arrested for civil disobedience. He also describes doing other 
more common, although perhaps less sensational, individual support work. “…a lot of the 
[movement] people who I deal with are in crisis personally. So you might help them keep their 
electricity on, or get their house back, or something like that, just so that they can stay active in 
the social justice campaign, because they are all volunteers.” 
When the lawyers discuss their motivations to pursue a career in the law, each of them 
says something about feeling a calling to help make people’s lives better in some way.  One way 
in which a lawyer might do this is by representing individuals and helping people find solutions 
to their problems one person and one problem at a time. This type of work has the advantage for 
the lawyers of providing personal interaction with the people they are serving in a way that 
allows them to see tangible results of their work. But most of the cause lawyers interviewed for 
this study indicate that this mode of helping individuals work through their problems, addressing 
the symptoms of their conditions, is not enough for them in and of itself. They seek modes of 
practice that they understand to be more directed at causes of the problems that people face. The 
lawyers differ some in the professional decisions they make in response to this fact. Some choose 
to only work with individuals through their work with organizations explicitly focused on social 
change. Some choose individual clients based on whether they can conceptualize the case as 
being embedded within a larger movement.  Some choose to work on impact litigation that is 
rooted in the stories of real people. They make these different professional choices based on a 
common desire to work towards broader, more expansive remedies that will have a greater 
impact on a greater number of people. They see their work as hopefully alleviating some of the 
individually felt symptoms of systemic injustices along a path that is ultimately guided by a 
desire to root out and attack the root causes of these struggles. 
 94
 Expanding notions of professional and political responsibilities 
 
When discussing the nature of his daily work Respondent G suggests that most people 
have an inaccurate understanding of what lawyers actually do in their day-to-day work. He 
thinks that this is particularly so in the case of social justice lawyers working in public interest 
roles. Respondent G suggests that the courtroom dramas of television and cinema create a 
prevalent, but largely inaccurate, understanding that lawyers spend most of their time on 
litigation, either preparing cases or arguing them in court. He thinks that this might be the case 
for some corporate lawyers in big firms, but the reality of the day-to-day work of the cause 
lawyer is quite different and more varied than these media portrayals suggest. 
In an effort to gain a better understanding of the type of work that cause lawyers do, I 
asked each interviewee to talk about the percentage breakdown of their time spent on litigation 
versus their other responsibilities as cause lawyers. In this section of the analysis, I will first look 
into what the interviewees have to say about this percentage breakdown of their work activities. 
This will open into a discussion of the types of non-litigation work with which they are involved 
and a look at what they identify as the positive, indirect effects of their litigation work. 
All respondents, with the exception of one, indicate that they spend a minority of their 
work hours focused on the traditional lawyering work of litigation. Respondents qualified this in 
similar ways such as, “very little time,” “a very small amount,” and “less than you would think.” 
In addition, nearly all were able to give fairly precise numerical percentages because of time 
management records that they choose to or are required to maintain. These ranged from a low of 
10% to a high of 30% of their total work time spent preparing for or engaging in courtroom 
litigation. On the high end of percent-litigation responses, Respondent G indicated that the 30% 
figure is “a little higher…actually quite a bit higher than other organizations doing the same type 
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of work. We are really a litigation organization.” It is telling to learn that even a lawyer working 
for what he characterizes as a “litigation organization” spends only less than a third of his time 
working on litigious matters. This particular lawyer works for an organization that does 
individual and impact work for low-income residents who cannot afford legal counsel, and 
although he characterizes his organization as a litigation organization, he says, “But we do 
believe in other forms of advocacy too. And obviously, a lot can be done through informal 
advocacy or relationships with other people in the community including legislators, social 
service agencies and government agencies.” 
 Respondent I indicated that a greater percentage of her work used to be focused on 
litigation before Hurricane Katrina. But since the storm she has found it necessary to do more 
varied types of community and organizational support work as part of the recovery. She sees an 
important post-Katrina, partial shift in emphasis regarding the roles of lawyers connected to 
popular movements and community organizations. She explains that because “…everything is up 
in the air about what our world is going to end up looking like…[and because] we have all these 
new programs that are getting rolled out,” that these lawyers have professional and political 
opportunities and responsibilities to participate in the post-Katrina policy setting processes and to 
advocate for a just recovery in the interest of the grassroots groups and the people with whom 
they are allied. For this reason, she and others spend an even greater percentage of their time 
post-Katrina doing impact work or policy advocacy than they did prior to the storm. There is an 
apparent heightened tension in post-Katrina New Orleans between this need to do more broadly 
focused impact work and the drastic increase in need for direct representation and legal counsel 
that individuals experience. The ways in which the respondents understand this tension is 
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explored in greater detail in the previous section of this chapter entitled Ameliorating symptoms 
versus addressing root causes. 
The one exception to the pattern of less emphasis on litigation was Respondent J who 
was an outlier in this and several other categories of response. Although he was not able to offer 
a precise numerical percentage, he indicated that he spent a majority of his time preparing for 
litigation and simply said, “As a lawyer, that’s what you do.” It is interesting, but not surprising, 
to note that this particular respondent also indicated a much more unquestioned faith in the 
promise of litigation by itself to open up opportunities for social change. He also maintains a 
more traditional lawyer-client relationship to the community with which he works, and he has 
been involved in supporting social justice work for fewer years than most other respondents. 
The average percentage of time devoted to litigation reported for all of the lawyers who 
indicate that they spend much less time litigating than doing other types of lawyering is 
approximately 25%. Respondents report spending the majority of their time, about 75% on 
average, engaged in other activities not directly related to litigation that are designed to support 
the social justice interests of community groups, individuals, and the interests of broadly defined 
social justice movements of one kind or another. This set of interviews contains a wealth of 
information about cause lawyers taking action in non-litigious ways that are still within the 
bounds of the traditional responsibilities of the lawyer. These narratives also offer a number of 
examples of ways in which most of these lawyers typically take action that are fairly removed 
from traditional lawyering roles. In the next few pages, I examine the variety of ways that these 
lawyers report supporting social justice initiatives in their work beyond the mode of litigation. 
Because it is perhaps most revealing to consider the exceptions to traditional modes of 
lawyering, I focus greater attention on these. 
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Respondent B shares a number of activities that she focuses on in her work that are both 
not related to litigation and outside of the realm of what lawyers traditionally do. She says, 
To be completely honest the amount of time that we actually spend on litigation is like 15 
to 20 percent, smaller than you would think, I mean in terms of actually drafting 
pleadings or going to court or strategizing around that. The rest of it is all writing things, 
talking, going to meetings, figuring out how to bring in media, whether it’s like news or 
folks from universities, or otherwise you can bring attention to things, also, like 
organizing, holding meetings, trainings, we give a lot of trainings. Right now [my 
partner] and I have a lot of administrative work that we are doing to keep the organization 
going…fundraising and stuff. We do a bunch of general ‘know your rights’ trainings. We 
are reporting on things that the city is doing unlawfully [in the disaster recovery 
process]….We have done a lot of work to discover public information that is actually 
hard to get a hold of and we are posting it on our website so that people can have access 
to it in a way that people can easily digest. Not just education, but housing and workers’ 
rights, know your rights trainings, but web-based. 
  
This passage contains at least ten different examples of traditional and non-traditional types of 
support work that these lawyers do. Of particular interest is the activity of collecting and 
disseminating information to the public. This was an activity that was described by a majority of 
the lawyers interviewed. Most framed this as a particular need in the post-Katrina environment in 
New Orleans and see this as a major contribution that they, as lawyers, can make to the popular 
movement for a just recovery for all segments of society. Respondent B notes,  
 
…litigation is some small percentage of my time and the rest of it is either working with 
community groups to give them the information they need for their communities about 
housing or FEMA. It’s mostly hurricane related stuff, but now everything is so hurricane 
related that it could be anything, basically. We have some how-to packets. How to do a 
FEMA Appeal, How to Deal with Contractor Fraud, etc. I think that the role that lawyers 
can play is by providing reliable information that community groups can use. That’s how 
this clinic started. It was like an informational clinic. There is so much going on out 
there. So how do you make sense and make sure that people have accurate and up-to-date 
information? So that’s one part of it. And the other huge part of it is…helping them 
connect with resources in the community. 
 
Contained in this passage is the idea that, especially given the reality of what it is to try to 
navigate the complexities of post-Katrina recovery, cause lawyers can use their research skills, 
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relative ease of access to resources, and established connections to community leaders and 
grassroots groups to support efforts towards a just recovery.  Two respondents specifically 
indicated that they have developed their websites to facilitate the distribution of information to 
individual citizens and community advocacy organizations. These lawyers recognize an 
overwhelming need for this type of support coming from the communities in which they work. A 
number of informants indicate that this level of community support was necessary pre-Katrina, 
but that, in post-Katrina New Orleans, such needs have multiplied and compounded in a way that 
allows these lawyers to see a clear connection between doing this technical support work and 
supporting a larger movement towards a just recovery for all. From a resource mobilization 
perspective, we can see that an increase in post-Katrina social movement activity is correlated 
with an increase in cause lawyer participation in the resource mobilization process of social 
movement development. These cause lawyers interviewed here suggest that there are certain 
types of resources that they as a group are particularly adept at mobilizing in the interest of social 
movements. 
 Most respondents indicate that they prefer providing informal advocacy and distributing 
information to the public by way of their connections to community groups. They told me that 
they are inclined to do this because they feel like it is an efficient use of their limited time and, 
perhaps more importantly, because it is more likely to empower a greater number of people in 
the long run to get this information out to and through grassroots groups and community 
organizations. Respondent G says, “We do a lot of community organizing…we do a lot of 
outreach…and we get a lot of invitations to come talk to community groups.” Respondent I says, 
“…the community group piece is definitely a chunk of the advocacy work.” There is an 
interesting tension here between this preferred method of working with groups and the need that 
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these lawyers express to make personal connections with individuals. This idea was explored in 
some more detail in the section on how these lawyers negotiate a balance between working for 
systemic change and connecting to the individuals in the communities they are motivated to 
support. 
Throughout these interviews, as was highlighted in the first theme of this chapter, most of 
the cause lawyer respondents express a measured skepticism about the use of litigation by itself 
to directly effect substantive change on the issues on which they work. This does not mean, of 
course, that they don’t engage in litigation as part of a broader strategy.  In fact, they do. And 
despite their general skepticism, they recognize a number of important indirect effects of 
litigation. They emphasize certain positive outcomes of litigation that can support the goals of a 
social movement regardless of whether or not a case is ultimately successful in court. 
Respondent F expresses skepticism about the court’s tendency to deliver true justice and 
offers some examples of peripheral benefits of court action to the movement. Specifically, he 
points to information discovery and temporary stoppage of an impending negative action to 
allow the broader movement to focus its energy on other tactics. 
People can hope for things to get done in the court, but usually the things you get out of 
court are not, in the end result, ultimate justice… Maybe you hold some people 
accountable. Maybe you get some information. Lawsuits can be a way to discover 
information that can be useful to the larger movement. Or maybe you are able to prolong 
it so that other things can happen either in Congress, or City Council or State or 
something. And so there’s little things and they are not the end, but it is an opportunity 
for some change. 
 
Another lawyer, Respondent E, confirms and elaborates on the peripheral benefit of information 
discovery that Respondent F mentions in the passage above. 
The litigation process can discover information that would be helpful for people to lobby, 
or to raise hell, or to write articles, or to give people some support, or at least to allow 
folks tell their whole story to people, so at least they understand how they are getting          
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screwed, as opposed to taking the standard story that we are doing it for your own good, 
or you are not good enough for this or for this, etc. 
 
This last passage also suggests the specific importance of the litigation process to the 
movement of allowing people a venue in which they can formally address their grievances to the 
power structure that so critically impacts their lives. In the section of this chapter that focuses on 
how cause lawyers measure success, I proposed that this is one of the most important roles of the 
cause lawyer engaged in litigation, to provide the space for people’s voices to be heard. A prime 
example of this occurred in the movement to defend New Orleans public housing developments 
from proposed demolition. In November of 2006, after months of the Housing Authority moving 
forward with its plans for demolition without any meaningful consideration of the needs and 
voices of the residents, court action initiated by cause lawyers working in the interest of the 
movement forced a public meeting at which dozens of residents were able to, for the first time, 
speak out in an official forum and to make their voices heard by those making these critical 
policy decisions. This turned out to be a liberating experience for individuals and an invigorating 
moment in the trajectory of the movement. Respondent F talks about the power of such events 
and the difficulty in precisely assessing the personal and community psychic benefits and what 
empowerment this might lead to. “You don’t know if some kid got to see his mom stand up and 
point her finger at somebody and really tell the truth, and that might inspire him in ways that we 
just can’t know.” 
 The data that relate to this theme of expanding notions of professional and political 
responsibilities indicate that lawyers have developed alternative ways in which they can 
participate in movement efforts, in part, due to a climate that has been increasingly inhospitable 
to the legal claims of grassroots social justice organizations and their lawyers. In this section and 
throughout the chapter, the lawyers offer a number of examples of how they avoid or move away 
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from the traditional lawyer role of disputer to participate in collaborative ways in many aspects 
of the social movement, from organizing meetings, to offering education opportunities, to 
framing the struggles and goals through media, to strategizing actions, and numerous other 
supportive activities.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis research originated with an inquiry into how cause lawyers conceive of and 
negotiate the various social, political and practical challenges that arise in their work with social 
movements. I conducted this inquiry to help answer the following questions central to the study 
of cause lawyers and social movements. What do lawyers do for, and to, social movements? 
How, when, and why do social movements turn to and use lawyers and legal strategies? In what 
ways do lawyers and legal strategies tend to advance or constrain movement goals? And, how do 
lawyers shape movements and how do movements shape lawyers? The research process yielded 
a wealth of information that contributes to answering these questions. In the following pages I 
begin with a summary of the key findings of this research. Then I return to the original research 
questions to assess what these findings offer in terms of answers to these core questions and what 
larger lessons can be drawn from this research. 
A primary finding of this research is that cause lawyers present a measured skepticism 
concerning the utility of legal mechanisms to effect enduring social change. They understand that 
legal pressure in isolation, even if it results in a victory in court, does not necessarily equate to 
meaningful social change. Despite their beliefs in its limitations, these lawyers do not reject 
rights discourse or traditional legal mechanisms altogether. They recognize the transformative 
value of the law and rights claiming for marginalized people and the value that it can offer to 
movement building. They see some potential for redress through the law, but recognize that this 
is only likely to occur in the context of a vibrant social movement. Because of this they often 
collaborate with movement activists to help search out alternative strategies for action around the 
causes they support, strategies that complement or replace litigation. The limitations of legal 
 103
tactics encourage cause lawyers to explore broader ways that they can be active in efforts to 
support the causes to which they are committed. 
Claiming membership in the activist community, expressing solidarity with a cause, and 
feeling a sense of belonging to a larger movement provide a certain type of sustenance to cause 
lawyers that motivates them to continue to struggle to work towards often evasive movement 
goals. These lawyers see their efforts as being situated in the contemporary social justice 
movements that they support as well as being connected to historical global and local struggles 
for justice. This perspective allows them to take a long view of the potential effects of their 
work. Understanding themselves as being situated within this context helps them to continue, 
often without the benefit of immediate, tangible and widespread results, to work toward their 
ultimate goals because they are able to see small successes as contributing to the larger effort of 
working for social justice. 
The informants clearly express a common understanding that their roles as cause lawyers 
are essentially support roles. Cause lawyers committed to social justice participate in integral 
ways in social movement activity that include but extend beyond litigation. They have special 
skills to offer in a specific arena of action, but at the same time, they try to remain cognizant of 
the broader agenda of the group. This motivates them to develop their range of skills beyond 
litigation to most effectively support their causes.   
Almost unanimously, the respondents indicate that, in their worlds, success is not 
measured in the traditional terms of wins and losses. They look beyond whether or not they are 
winning cases to find alternative measures of how they and the larger movement are being 
successful in their work. They emphasize certain positive outcomes of litigation and the other 
support work that they do that buoy the goals of their causes regardless of whether or not a case 
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is ultimately successful in court. In concordance with the very high importance they place on 
relationships with clients and social movement activists, many measure success by the quality of 
their relationships with the people with whom and for whom they work. Cause lawyers report 
that simply being a part of a collective struggle and supporting a continued resistance helps them 
feel successful in their work, and they find success when they feel that their work provides a 
vehicle for the previously unheard to have their voices heard.  
There is a tension in the work of cause lawyers between the motivation to participate in 
more broadly focused social change work and the underlying motivation to help people in an 
environment in which there is such enormous, immediate, and unmet need for individual 
representation. Cause lawyers develop ways of practicing in which they feel they are able to 
maintain a balance between serving the needs of individuals and doing more broadly focused 
social impact work. They have varied ideas about the best way to do this, but despite the 
differences in their chosen modes of practice, they base these choices on a common desire to 
work towards broader, more expansive remedies that will have a greater impact on a greater 
number of people. 
A fundamental contribution of this research is its recognition that cause lawyers develop 
models of professional practice that extend well beyond the standards of traditional lawyering to 
include some of the key components of community organizing. Cause lawyers as a group focus 
less on the traditional lawyering work of litigation than they do on other activities not directly 
related to litigation that are designed to support the social justice interests of community groups, 
individuals, and the interests of broadly defined social justice movements of one kind or another. 
In part due to a climate that has been increasingly inhospitable to the legal claims of grassroots 
social justice movements and their lawyers, cause lawyers have developed alternative ways in 
 105
which they can participate in movement efforts. They tend to avoid or move away from the 
traditional lawyer role of disputer to participate in collaborative ways in many aspects of the 
social movement including organizing meetings, offering education opportunities, framing the 
struggles and goals through media, strategizing actions, and numerous other supportive activities. 
 Although most cause lawyers do not come to the profession through previous experience 
as community organizers, their experience working with social movements encourages them to 
expand their professional roles in that direction. A view of the dimensions of cause lawyering 
through the lens of social movement theory suggests a blending of lawyering and community 
organizing in their professional lives. Although they participate in these activities to varying 
degrees and with varying success, on a basic level, the work of cause lawyers centers on the key 
social movement activities of assessing political opportunities, mobilizing resources and 
contributing to the collective framing process. In this way, the notion of “lawyer as organizer” 
comes into focus through an examination of cause lawyering from the social movement 
perspective. 
 Having summarized the key findings I will now return to the core research questions 
identified at the outset of this project to determine what answers these findings offer. This 
research began with the following four interrelated questions concerning cause lawyering and 
social movements. What do lawyers do for, and to, social movements? How, when, and why do 
social movements turn to and use lawyers and legal strategies? In what ways do lawyers and 
legal strategies tend to advance or constrain movement goals? And, how do lawyers shape 
movements and how do movements shape lawyers? I will reflect on each of these in turn and 
then take a holistic look at the findings and conclusions in relation to the set of research 
questions to draw out the larger lessons that emerge from this research. 
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What do lawyers do for, and to, social movements? In what ways do lawyers and legal strategies 
tend to advance or constrain movement goals?  
 I will consider the two questions above concurrently because of their similar and 
overlapping focus. Among the things that lawyers do for social movements is of course the 
traditional work of lawyering. This work includes preparing and litigating cases in the interests 
of social movement causes. It also includes empowering movements by representing their 
interests in disputes with opposing interests of the state and elite players outside of the courtroom 
through informal negotiation and the use of tactics such as letter writing and phone calling that 
may encourage concessions through the threat of legal action. Lawyers also support social 
movements by way of non-adversarial support work such as offering legal advice concerning 
possible consequences of planned movement strategy and through the more mundane legal work 
of helping movement organizations negotiate processes such as establishing non-profit status and 
by assisting activists with their legal problems so that they can continue to participate in 
activities of the movement. This type of assistance ranges from working to get activists who have 
been arrested for civil disobedience quickly back “on the street” to assisting activists with other 
legal problems unrelated to movement activities so that they can focus more fully on social 
movement organizing. 
 A key finding of this research is that the traditional legal work described above represents 
only a minority of the work that cause lawyers do for social movements. They spend the largest 
portion of their time on work that is less commonly associated with the work of conventional 
lawyers. They use their research skills and relative ease of access to resources to collect and 
distribute essential information to individual citizens and community groups. They are heavily 
involved in the framing of key issues to the general public in ways that are aimed at increasing 
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popular support for movement goals. They also use their professional connections with people 
such as other lawyers and law students, legislators, and employees of social service and 
government agencies to mobilize support and garner resources for their causes. 
 Just as important as what cause lawyers do for social movements is the question of what 
they do to social movements. Specifically, I was interested in the course of this research to learn 
some about whether or not lawyers and the tactics that they use influence movements to follow a 
trajectory that possibly conflicts with movement goals. My assessment at the end of this study is 
that cause lawyers, as a special category of lawyers, are especially attuned and committed to 
movement goals such that they are hyper-conscious of such issues and strive to maintain primary 
allegiance to the goals of the larger movement. Cause lawyers develop close relationships with 
other movement participants and strive to work in solidarity with social movements such that 
accountability develops in these relationships that prevents or corrects tendencies for lawyers to 
do things to social movements that would take them off course. 
 Since specific information regarding what cause lawyers do to social movements was 
somewhat more difficult to distill from the respondent narratives than information concerning 
what they do for social movements, the assessment I offer above could possibly be better 
confirmed or refuted with an analysis of these relationships from the perspective of other 
movement activists, a point that I will address later in this section in my suggestions for further 
research.  
How, when, and why do social movements turn to and use lawyers and legal strategies? 
 This research shows that rather than “outsourcing” the legal support needs of social 
movements by merely enlisting the technical support of lawyers for specific tasks for a limited 
period of time, social movements more commonly develop ongoing relationships with cause 
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lawyers such that these lawyers become integrated into social movement networks and are 
available as resources to movements when needs arise. As is indicated throughout the findings of 
this research, social movements do turn to lawyers when they decide to litigate, but they also 
involve cause lawyers more thoroughly in other aspects of movement strategizing and carrying 
out of activities. 
 Movements turn to the cause lawyers in their midst at all stages of movement activity for 
the legal and extra-legal support they can offer. In the movement building stage, they often turn 
to cause lawyers as partners in their efforts to raise consciousness of a particular issue in the 
public sphere and provide a catalyst for growth of the movement. Just as lawyers and legal 
strategies can contribute to building early-stage movement participation and momentum, so too 
can they be used as tools in later movement stages that focus on compelling concessions from 
opposing forces. In this way movements use lawyers and legal strategies as one of their 
leveraging tools. 
 To answer the third part of the research question, why social movements turn to and use 
lawyers and legal strategies, it makes sense to look to the legacy of rights discourse in American 
social movement history. This research shows that, even aside from judicially upheld rights 
claims, social movements benefit in a host of ways from the processes and outcomes of their 
rights claiming. Because of this, even in a context in which rights are unlikely to be upheld in 
court or enforced in practice, social movements continue to turn to lawyers to assist in the 
process of framing and claiming rights to the movement goals they pursue.    
How do lawyers shape movements and how do movements shape lawyers? 
 This research reveals that one way that cause lawyers contribute to the shaping of social 
movements is by framing the legal system for movement participants. The cause lawyers in this 
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study indicate that they often find themselves in the role of “managing expectations” for 
achieving success related to movement goals in the realm of the courts. They say that this is 
especially true in the current political context in which they see courts as especially inhospitable 
to the claims of the causes they support. In this way cause lawyers shape movements by 
encouraging multi-faceted approaches to movement activities that do not rely too heavily on the 
courts for relief. Interestingly, this understanding gained in this research contradicts suggestions 
by other researchers that lawyers shape movements by encouraging them to rely too heavily on 
legal tactics. 
 This research also adds to the understanding of how lawyers are shaped by their 
participation in social movements. The nontraditional strategies that cause lawyers employ in 
their work with social movements are ones that they develop in the context of their work with 
movements. Lawyers in this study report that they develop these nontraditional skills in large 
part by learning from the experienced community organizers with whom they work. Cause 
lawyers learn nontraditional ways of taking action from movement organizers including direct 
engagement and organizing of collective action, public education, media outreach, human rights 
reporting, and political organizing and campaigning. Through such skill transfers movements 
shape lawyers in ways that expand their professional roles such that cause lawyers often merge 
their roles as legal specialists with essential elements of community organizing. 
  
 Throughout this research it has been clear that social movements and cause lawyers 
operate in a dynamic environment and collaborate to respond to the constraints presented by 
particular legal, political and social contexts and to the opportunities that they provide. Social 
movements respond to the relatively inhospitable legal, political, and social environments with 
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which they are confronted by persevering in their struggles and adapting their tactical responses 
of which legal tactics are but one type. Similarly, cause lawyers, in their primary commitment to 
the causes for which they work, respond to such inhospitable legal, social, and political contexts 
by persevering with the skills they have at hand and by seeking out new skills and strategies for 
action. This research reminds us of the complexities and challenges of this social justice work, 
but it also reminds us that it is grassroots collaborations such as those between cause lawyers and 
social movements that give social movements their distinctive character and power to 
persistently work toward elusive goals of social justice. 
 Law is likely to continue to be an arena in which movements and cause lawyers engage in 
their efforts to realize a more just society, and cause lawyers are likely to continue to struggle to 
understand how to best work in solidarity with the movements they support given particular 
changes in movement dynamics and legal, social, and political contexts. As one of my 
respondents said, “The pendulum will swing back our way sometime, but it only swings when 
we all keep pushing it in every way we can.” 





Agid, Shana. 2007. “Locked and Loaded: The Prison Industrial Complex and the Response to 
Hurricane Katrina.” Pp. 55-75 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social Justice in the United 
States, edited by K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. 
Albiston, Catherine. 1999. “The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing 
by Winning.” Law and Society Review 33(4):869-910. 
Arena, Jay. 2007. “Whose City Is It? Public Housing, Public Sociology, and the Struggle for 
Social Justice in New Orleans after Katrina.” Pp.367-386 in Through the Eye of Katrina: 
Social Justice in the United States, edited by K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham. N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Bachman, Steve. 1985. “Lawyers and social change.” New York University Review of Law and 
Social Change 1:6. 
Bates, Benjamin R. and Rakhsana Ahmed. 2007. “Disaster Pornography: Hurricane Katrina, 
Voyeurism, and the Television Viewer.” Pp. 187-201 in Through the Eye of Katrina: 
Social Justice in the United States, edited by K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Bates, Kristin A. and Richelle S. Swan. 2007a. “Social Justice in the face of the Storm: When 
Natural Disasters Become Social Disasters.” Pp. 3-12 in Through the Eye of Katrina: 
Social Justice in the United States, edited by K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
 112
Bates, Kristin A. and Richelle S. Swan. 2007b. “You CAN Get There from Here, But the Road is 
Long and Hard: The Intersection of Social Justice and Social Disasters Post-Katrina.” Pp. 
397-407 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social Justice in the United States, edited by 
K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. 
Bell, Derrick. 2004. Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes 
for Racial Reform. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Black, Jonathan, ed. 1971. Radical lawyers: Their Role in the Movement and in the Courts. New 
York: Avon Books. 
Brinkley, Douglas. 2006. The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast. New York: Harper Collins.  
Check, Terence. 2007. “The Voices of Katrina: Ethos, Race and Congressional Testimonies.” Pp. 
239-259 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social Justice in the United States, edited by 
K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. 
CBS News. 2005. “Katrina Victims: Racism at Play.” Retrieved Feb 24, 2008. 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/12/06/katrina/main1101473.shtml) 
Crenshaw, Kimberle, Neil Gotanda, Garry Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds. 1995. Critical Race 
Theory: the Key Writings that Formed the Movement. New York: The New Press.  
Cummings, Scott L. 2006. “Mobilization Lawyering.” Pp. 302-335 in Cause Lawyers and Social 
Movements, edited by A. Sarat and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic, eds. 1995. Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge. 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
 113
Delgado, Richard and Jean Stefancic. 2001. Critical Race Theory: An Introduction. New York: 
New York University Press. 
Doane, Ashley. 2007. “New Song, Same Old Tune: Racial Discourse in the Aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina.” Pp. 105-124 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social Justice in the 
United States, edited by K.A. Bates and R. S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic 
Press. 
Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. 2004. “Resources and Social Movement Mobilization.” In 
 The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule and H. 
 Kriesi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
Flaherty, Jordan. 2005. “New Orleans’ Culture of Resistance.” Social Policy 36(2):25-28. 
Galanter, Marc. 1974 “Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal 
 Change.” Law and Society Review. 9(1):95-160. 
Hartman, Chester and Gregory D. Squires, eds. 2006. There is No Such Thing as a Natural 
 Disaster. New York: Routledge.
Hilbink, Thomas M. 2004. “You know the type…: Categories of Cause Lawyering.” Law and 
Social Inquiry 29:657-698. 
Horne, Jed. 2006. Unnatural Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Drowning of New Orleans. 
New York: Random House. 
Hutchinson, Allan C. and Patrick Monahan. 1984. "Law, Politics and The Critical Legal  
 Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought." Stanford Law Review 
36:199-245. 
Jones, Charles E., ed. 1998. The Black Panther Party: Reconsidered. Baltimore, MD: Black 
Classic Press. 
 114
Jones, Bernie D. 2002. “Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civil Rights in the New 
Millennium?” Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal Vol. 18. 
Jones, Lynn. 2003."Saving a Movement from Destruction: Lawyers as Framers, Strategists, and 
Preservers During Abeyance" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 16, 2003 Retrieved 
February 24, 2008. (http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p107183_index.htm) 
______. 2006. “The Haves Come Out Ahead: How Cause Lawyers Frame the Legal System for 
Movements.” Pp. 182-196 in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, edited by A. Sarat 
and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
______. 2008 "Bringing Social Movement Theory into the Study of Cause Lawyers" Paper  
presented at the annual meeting of the Law and Society, J.W. Las Vegas, NV.  Retrieved 
February 24, 2008. (http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p17618_index.htm) 
Kincheloe, Joe L. and Peter McLaren. 2000. “Rethinking critical theory and qualitative  
research.” Pp. 279-314 in Handbook of qualitative research. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
 Sage. 
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1991. “Resource Mobilization Theory: A Critique.” Pp. 323-347 in Research 
on Social Movements - The State of the Art in Europe and the USA. Boulder, Colorado:  
Western Press. 
Klein, Naomi. 2007. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: 
 Metropolitan Books. 
Komesar, Neil and Burton A. Weisbrod. 1978. “The Public Interest Law Firm: A Behavioral 
Analysis. Pp. 80-101 in Public interest law: An economic and institutional analysis. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 115
Kurzman, Charles. 1996. “Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social  
Movement Theory.” American Sociological Review 61:153-178.  
Ladson-Billings, Gloria. 1998. “Just What is Critical Race Theory, and What’s it Doing in a Nice 
Place like Education?” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 11(1):7-
24. 
Laska, Shirley. 2007. “Social Movements.” Lecture in Sociology of Disasters. University of New 
Orleans. November 2007. New Orleans, LA. 
Laska, Shirley and Betty Morrow. 2006. “Social Vulnerabilities and Hurricane Katrina: an 
 unnatural disaster in New Orleans” Marine Technology Society Journal 40:16-26. 
Levitsky, Sandra. 2006. “To Lead with the Law: Reassessing the Influence of Legal Advocacy 
Organizations in Social Movements.” Pp. 145-163 in Cause Lawyers and Social 
Movements, edited by A. Sarat and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Lipsitz, George. 2006.  "Learning from New Orleans: The Social Warrant of Hostile Privatism 
and Competitive Consumer Citizenship" in Cultural Anthropology  21:451-468. 
Lopez, Gerald P. 1992. Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law 
Practice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Marshall, Anna Marie. 2006. “Social Movement Strategies and the Participatory Potential of 
Litigation.” Pp. 164-181 in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, edited by A. Sarat and 
S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Marshall, Catherine and Gretchen B. Rossman. 2006. Designing Qualitative Research. 4th ed.  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 
 116
McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. Comparative  
Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and 
Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
McAdam, Doug. 1982. Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency,  
1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McCann, Michael and Jeffrey Dudas. 2006. “Retrenchment . . . and Resurgence?: Mapping the 
Changing Context of Movement Lawyering in the United States.” Pp. 37-59 in Cause 
Lawyers and Social Movements, edited by A. Sarat and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
McCann, Michael. 1994. Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics of Legal  
Mobilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkhoff. 2004. “Conceptualizing Political Opportunity”  
Social Forces 82(4):1457-1492.  
Miller, DeMond S. and Jason Rivera. 2007. “Setting the Stage: Roots of Social Inequity and the 
Human Tragedy of Hurricane Katrina.” Pp. 15-35 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social 
Justice in the United States, edited by K.A. Bates and R. S. Swan. Durham, N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Oberschall, Anthony. 1973. Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall. 
O’Connell, Peter. 2006. “Resistance and Grassroots Responses in Post-Katrina New Orleans:  
Case Studies of an Emergent Self-determination Movement.” Unpublished  
manuscript, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA.  (on file with the author). 
 117
Papke, David R. 1998. Heretics in the Temple: Americans who Reject the Nation’s Legal Faith. 
New York: New York University Press. 
Peck, Jamie. 2006. "Liberating the City: Between New York and New Orleans" Urban 
 Geography 27:681-713. 
Piven, Frances F. and Richard Cloward. 1977. Poor People’s Movements. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Quigley, William P. 2006. “Revolutionary Lawyering.” Journal of Law and Policy 20:101-168. 
______. 1994. “Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of 
Community Organizations.” Ohio Northern University Law Review 21:455-479. 
Rahim, Malik. 2006. Personal Interview. November 2006. 
Rathke, Wade and Beulah Labostrie. 2006. “The Role of Local Organizing.” Pp. 255-270 in 
There is No Such Thing as  Natural Disaster, edited by C. Hartmann and G.D. Squires. 
New York: Routledge. 
Reed, Betsy, ed. 2006. Unnatural Disaster: The Nation on Hurricane Katrina. New York: 
Nation Books. 
Rodriguez, Havidán Joseph Trainor, and Enrico L. Quarantelli. 2006. “Rising to the Challenges 
 of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial Behavior following Hurricane Katrina” 
 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604:82-101. 
Rosenberg, Gerald. 1991. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring about Social Change? Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press. 
Rossman, Gretchen B. and Sharon F. Rallis. 2003. Learning in the Field: An Introduction to  
Qualitative Research. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
 118
Sarat, Austin and Stuart Scheingold, eds. 2006. Cause Lawyers and Social Movements. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
______. 2005. Something to Believe In: Politics, Professionalism, and Cause Lawyering. Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. 
______. 1998. Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Scheingold, Stuart. 1998. “The Struggle to Politicize Left Legal Practice: A Case Study of Left 
Activist Lawyering in Seattle.” in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, edited by A. 
Sarat and S. Scheingold. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Seidman, I.E. 1998. Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for Researchers in  
Education and the Social Sciences. 2nd ed. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Silverstein, Helena. 1996. Unleashing Rights: Law, Meaning and the Animal Rights Movement. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press. 
Smelser, Neil J. 1963. Theory of Collective Behavior. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Bedford. 1992. “Master Frames and Cycles of Protest.” Pp.  
 133-155 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by Aldon D. Morris and Carol 
McClurg Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Stein, Alan H. and Gene B. Preuss. 2006. “Oral History, Folklore and Katrina.” Pp. 37-58 in 
There is No Such Thing as  Natural Disaster, edited by C. Hartmann and G.D. Squires. 
New York: Routledge. 
Steinberg, Theodore. 2006. Acts of God: The Unnatural History of Natural Disaster in America. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 119
Swan, Richelle S. 2007. “Social Justice Movements: Education Disregarded, Lessons Ignored.” 
Pp. 77-93 in Through the Eye of Katrina: Social Justice in the United States, edited by 
K.A. Bates and R.S. Swan. Durham. N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. 
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Valdes, Francisco, Jerome McCrystal Culp and Angela P. Harris, eds. 2002. Crossroads, 
Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Weinstein, Scott. 2005. “Katrina: Direct Action vs. Government Guns.” Retrieved April 6, 2008. 
(http://www.darknightpress.org/index.php?i=news&c=recent&view=40&long=1) 
Wexler, Stephen. 1970. “Practicing Law for Poor People.” The Yale Law Journal 79(5):1049-
1067. 
Zald, Mayer and John D. McCarthy. 1980. “Social Movement Industries: Cooperation and  
 Conflict Amongst Social Movement Organizations.” in Research in Social Movements, 




Peter O’Connell was born in Nashville, Tennessee in 1973. He received a B.A. from Columbia 
University in 1995. He lived and worked in Oregon as a school teacher and environmental 
activist and came to New Orleans in 2005 as a volunteer relief worker in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina. 
 121
